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  introDuction
This section focuses on how minors may discover that they are at increased risk for a 
heritable genetic mutation, or that they have been tested for risk status (where this is 
the case). We also explore the privacy implications for minors who have undergone 
genetic testing on the basis of parental consent, and minors who may be considering 
genetic testing on the basis of their own informed consent. The privacy implications 
involved in the information arising from genetic testing are huge, not least because of 
the familial nature of the information. The focus of this report is on whether genetic 
testing raises new privacy issues for minors in particular. The broader issues of family 
entitlements and obligations, and professional discretions and duties in relation to 
familial genetic information, cannot be canvassed or resolved to any great extent in 
this report. 









them	to	believe	 that	 ‘they	were	 sick,	 that	 their	breasts	were	 somehow	or	other	
going	to	kill	them.’2
This first section examines disclosure of familial genetic risk specifically, and not 
disclosure of a minor’s genetic test results, which are discussed separately later. Usually, 
in order for a competent minor or an adult to seek genetic testing, she must be aware 
that a heritable condition exists in her family and that she is at risk. It would also be 
useful to know that genetic testing for the condition was possible. This knowledge 
may come from her parents, from wider family or whänau, from persons outside the 
family, or from her own observations and concerns or deductions.
Should, and if so, when, how, what and by whom should minors be informed of their 
genetic risk status?3 These are difficult issues, and much of the relevant discourse will 
lie outside the mandate of legislators, regulators and policy-makers.
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 2.  Disclosure from a health professional
Due to confidentiality obligations and privacy regulations health professionals 
generally cannot inform a minor that there is a heritable genetic condition in the 
family for which the minor may be at risk, if by revealing the information the health 
professional will breach another person’s privacy.4 The familial nature of genetic 
information means that if a minor is informed of genetic risk status, without being 
symptomatic or having been tested, then the minor will become aware that someone 
else in her family is similarly at risk or affected. This type of disclosure usually cannot 
be made without the permission of the person from whom the health information 
came (e.g. perhaps a parent with an identified inherited genetic mutation).
There is an issue of whose health information heritable genetic information is. Is 
genetic information the health information of the individual from whom it was 
gleaned, or is it the family’s health information? If genetic information is considered 
to be the family’s health information then arguably privacy and confidentiality 
would not be breached by the health professional discussing the genetic information 
with any of the family members. This conceptual issue is not uniquely related to 
the relationship between minor children, their parents and health professionals: its 
resolution may have much broader application and so it cannot be covered effectively 
in this report which focuses on genetic testing of minors.
2.1.1  Exceptions permitting disclosure
There are exceptions to the general prohibition on disclosure: personal information 
about an identifiable individual may be disclosed if the health agency believes on 
reasonable grounds that it is impracticable or undesirable to obtain the person’s 
consent and:
•	 the information is disclosed to a person nominated by the individual concerned 
or to the principal caregiver or a near relative of the individual concerned in 
accordance with recognised professional practice and the disclosure is not 
contrary to the express request of the individual or his or her representative 
(rule 11(2)(b), HIPC 1994); 
•	 the disclosure is made to prevent or lessen a serious and imminent threat to 
public health or safety or the life or health of the individual concerned, or 
another individual (rule 11(2)(d), HIPC 1994).5 
Note that in circumstances such as these the health agency holding the information 
has the discretion to disclose the information, and not a duty. Dawson comments that 
‘This discretion should be exercised on a principled basis, following the established 
policies of that agency or the ethics of the relevant profession.’6 
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The person’s consent to disclosure should usually still be sought by a health agency 
seeking to disclose information pursuant to one of these exceptions in rule 11(4): 
disclosure can only be made on one of these grounds when consent to disclosure is 
‘not desirable or not practicable’.
Disclosure under any of the exceptions above is also permitted only to the extent 
necessary for the particular purpose (rule 11(3), HIPC 1994).
This	limits	both	the	scope	of	the	material	that	may	be	disclosed	and	the	range	
of	 people	 to	 whom	 it	 may	 be	 sent.	 Only	 the	 minimum	 information	 necessary	 	
to	advance	the	authorised	aim	should	be	disclosed,	and	it	should	be	passed	only		
to	 those	 with	 a	 proper	 interest	 in	 receiving	 it	 or	 with	 authority	 to	 take	 the	
necessary	action.7	
2.1.2  Disclosure to a person nominated or principal caregiver or near relative in   
 accordance with recognised professional practice and not contrary to express   
 request 
This exception seems primarily directed at allowing health professionals to disclose 
certain health information about a patient to someone who is involved in caring for 
the person and may have to make decisions for that individual (whether medical 
decisions or otherwise). A ‘principal caregiver’ for the purposes of the HIPC, ‘in 
relation to any individual, means the friend of the individual or the member of the 
individual’s family group or whänau who is most evidently and directly concerned 
with the oversight of the individual’s care and welfare.’ Thus the ‘principal caregiver’ 
or ‘person nominated’ will generally not be a minor child. Despite the exception 
permitting disclosure to ‘a near relative,’ the provision was not intended to cover 
disclosure of a competent person’s genetic information to a near relative, without 
that person’s knowledge or consent. Such would not be a disclosure in accordance 
with recognized professional practice. Additionally the consent of the person whose 
health information might be disclosed would need to be sought before disclosure: 
generally pursuant to rule 11 of the HIPC, and also pursuant to the requirement that 
disclosure not be against their express request. 
2.1.3  Disclosure made to prevent or lessen a serious and imminent threat to public   
 health or safety or life or health of individual concerned, or another individual
In order to disclose under this exception, an agency needs to believe on reasonable 
grounds that:
•  there is a serious threat to public health, public safety or the life or health of   
an individual;
•  the threat is imminent;
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•  the disclosure of the information would prevent or lessen that threat; and
•  the disclosure of information is necessary to prevent or lessen the threat.
In considering whether the disclosure is ‘necessary’ agencies need to consider 
whether the threat could be prevented or minimised in some other way that does 
not involve the release of sensitive or confidential information. The disclosure 
must be made to a person who can do something to prevent or lessen the threat. 
To address an imminent threat, the recipient would need to have the power to act 
urgently to achieve a tangible result in the particular case.  A decision to disclose 
will only justify the disclosure of information that is necessary to prevent or lessen 
the threat. Agencies need to decide how much information needs to be disclosed. 
It may not be necessary for the whole file to be disclosed.
Current consensus is that breaching a patient’s privacy to inform relatives that the 
patient carries a heritable genetic mutation and that they are thus at increased risk, 
would not meet the threshold for disclosure under the ‘serious’ and ‘imminent’ threat 
test. Whilst the threat of a heritable genetic mutation might be serious, it is very 
unlikely to be imminent. 
Consider a patient with the HD mutation who did not want her minor children 
informed about their increased risk: not only is HD late onset, and thus not an 
‘imminent’ threat to her children, there are also no interventions available to ‘prevent 
or lessen’ the threat to a potential sufferer’s life or health, and thus disclosure cannot 
be justified by rule 11(2)(d) of the HIPC. 
Consider the case of a patient with breast cancer caused by a BRCA1 mutation, 
who does not want her minor daughters informed of the heritable mutation: while 
there may be interventions available which might prevent or lessen the threat to 
her daughters’ health, including increased surveillance or prophylactic surgery, the 
threat to her daughters is not ‘imminent,’ because breast cancer is also an adult-onset 
condition, with age-related penetrance. 
Elger and Harding have suggested that children cannot be informed, against parental 
wishes, that they are at risk of being carriers of or affected by a late-onset heritable 
genetic disorder on the basis of a parent’s affected status because ‘the possibility of 
influencing reproductive decisions has so far not been included as a sufficiently grave 
reason for breaching confidentiality’.8 In terms of disclosing increased risk for carrier 
status, there is also the difficulty of meeting the threshold of serious harm to the 
health or life of an individual: the health or lives of unconceived children or future 
individuals are not covered by the disclosure exception. 
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2.1.4  Common law exceptions
The common law duty of confidentiality that health professionals owe their patients 
can be breached on similar grounds as those outlined in the HIPC, and also where 
such is necessary in the public interest. Quite apart from whether the person’s privacy 
rights would be breached, would a health agency or professional be breaching the 
confidentiality of a patient if a minor was informed (without the consent of those 
affected) that someone in her family carried a heritable genetic mutation that she too 
may be at risk for? 




interest	 lies.	 …	The	 need	 to	 prevent	 imminent	 harm	 is	 one	 important	 public	
interest	of	this	kind	that	can	trump	confidentiality	…	The	categories	of	‘public	
interest’	that	may	trump	a	duty	of	confidence	are	not	closed.9	
It is arguable that there is a compelling public interest, and at the very least a public 
health interest, in people at risk for serious heritable disorders (particularly those that 
can be prevented, mitigated or managed with surveillance or early detection) being 
informed of their increased risk as soon as possible. Arguably, there is also public 
interest in parents not withholding this kind of information from their children and 
thereby perhaps contributing to the likelihood of their suffering poor health or even 
early death in the future. 
2.1.5  A duty to warn?
It is questionable whether a health professional who is aware that a minor is at 
increased risk for a heritable disorder which could be prevented or more effectively 
managed with surveillance or early detection would be held to have any ‘duty to warn’ 
the minor (as opposed to a discretion). 
…	a	duty	to	warn	a	potential	victim	of	a	patient’s	harmful	conduct	is	only	likely	
to	 be	 recognised	 in	 New	 Zealand	 as	 an	 aspect	 of	 the	 law	 of	 negligence	 when	
two	essential	criteria	are	met:	 there	 is	a	close	degree	of	proximity	between	the	
victim-plaintiff	 and	 the	 health	 professional	 concerned;	 and	 the	 weight	 of	 the	
policy	considerations	supports	the	imposition	of	liability	in	the	particular	case.	A	
sufficient	degree	of	proximity	must	exist	between	the	plaintiff	and	the	defendant	







at	 large,	 although	 excessive	 exposure	 to	 liability	 is	 obviously	 less	 of	 a	 concern	
when	a	threat	is	made	to	a	single	person	or	to	a	discrete	class.10	
On this basis it is perhaps conceivable that a duty to warn family members of 
increased risk for a heritable genetic mutation may exist (more so than a duty to 
warn people about potential violence from a patient.) The class of people who may 
benefit from such a warning is a discrete identifiable group, some of whom the health 
professional may indeed have a therapeutic relationship with also. Additionally, if the 
heritable condition in the family involves a fully or near fully penetrant mutation, 
such as those for HD or FAP, the predictability of harm arising at some stage will be 
greater than the predictability of a patient’s violence. However, the threshold may not 
be met in respect of conditions (such as HD) for which no prophylaxis or medical 
treatment exists. 
Both this issue and the issue of breaching confidentiality in the pubic interest are 
more general issues potentially affecting all people at risk for heritable genetic 
disorders and not just minors, and so cannot be discussed further here. 
Health professionals can encourage parents to inform their children of their increased 
risk for a heritable genetic mutation, but it will only be in rare circumstances that they 
will be in a position to inform the minors themselves, without unlawfully infringing 
the privacy of the parents. 
2.1.6  Access to personal health information
Minors are generally entitled to access any information held by any agency about 
themselves, pursuant to the Privacy Act 1993, and any health information, in particular, 
pursuant to rule 6 of the HIPC 1994. This would cover any medical notes or record 
of any discussion about whether or not a minor should have a genetic test, and the 
outcomes of any such discussions (including any test results if they had been tested.) 
2.1.7  Disclosure exceptions 
There are disclosure exceptions:
Privacy Act 1993









	 	 that	–		 	
	 	 (i)	The	information	relates	to	that	individual;	and	
	 	 (ii)	The	disclosure	of	the	information	(being	information	that	relates	to		
	 	 	 the	physical	or	mental	health	of	the	individual	who	requested	it)		
	 	 	 would	be	likely	to	prejudice	the	physical	or	mental	health	of	that		
	 	 	 individual;	or	
	 (d)	In	the	case	of	an	individual	under	the	age	of	16,	the	disclosure	of	that		
	 	 information	would	be	contrary	to	that	individual’s	interests.	
2.1.8  Disclosure involving unwarranted disclosure of the affairs of another individual 
The commentary to the HIPC acknowledges that 
…	 sometimes	 that	 information	 is	 inextricably	 linked	 with	 information	 about	
another	 person.	 Mixed	 information	 –	 that	 is	 information	 about	 two	 or	 more	
people	–	may	be	created	through	the	use	of	joint	counselling	sessions	or	because	
one	person	has	referred	to	another	in	the	course	of	treatment.	If	the	information	
cannot	 be	 separated	 out,	 agencies	 need	 to	 decide	 whether	 releasing	 the	 mixed	
information	 to	 the	 requester	 would	 involve	 an	 unwarranted	 disclosure	 of	 the	









There are two branches to this exception to the general rule of access to one’s own 
health information: the information must be about the affairs of another person; and 
disclosure of the information must be unwarranted (‘not justified’ or ‘without good 
and sufficient grounds.’)11 




their	 immediate	 family	 members.	There	 is	 no	 right	 of	 access	 to	 that	 material	
under	rule	6	…12
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…	the	 effects	 its	 disclosure	may	have	on	 the	 service’s	 ability	 to	 gather	 similar	
information	in	the	future,	must	be	weighed	against	the	patient’s	needs	to	obtain	
access	 to	all	 information	upon	which	 important	decisions	about	 their	position	
may	be	made	…13  
It is difficult to gauge the implications of this exception in the context of information 
about a heritable genetic condition within a family. Judging by the commentary to 
the HIPC, prepared by the Privacy Commissioner, it does not appear that shared 
genetic information was envisaged when section 29(1)(a) of the Privacy Act 1993 
was drafted. 
Deciding whether to refuse to disclose information concerning a familial genetic risk 
pursuant to section (29)(1)(a) would involve a balancing act: the health professional 
must balance the minor’s individual right to access information about her own 
health against the parents’ or other relatives’ rights to confidentiality of their own 
health information. 
When a minor is seeking information about the possibility of increased risk for 
a condition for which there is a family history, and discussions have taken place 
between the minor’s parents and health professional in the past about risk status, the 
health professional may disclose the minimum amount of information necessary to 
the minor to enable a decision to be made on the information, while protecting the 
confidentiality of the other family members. However, clearly, it would be difficult to 
separate the information out. If the minor is to consider genetic testing in light of the 
information learned from the health professional, the minor would need to be fully 
informed of the risk status in order to make an informed choice (see right 6 of the 
Code of Health and Disability Services Consumers’ Rights). This would necessarily 
involve the disclosure of information about the parents’ genetic risk status, as this 
impacts directly on the minor’s own risk status. 
In terms of the factors that the health professional would need to weigh up (as 
suggested by the HIPC Commentary), the information may be considered highly 
sensitive, relating as it does to the patient’s (and other of her relatives’) current and 
future health. The relationship between the minor and the parents must be taken 
into account, as must the likely reaction of the parents if their child was informed 
about increased risk for a heritable genetic mutation, on the basis of their health 
information without their consent. Again, public health interests in prevention or 
early detection may also be relevant. 
The issue of to whom the genetic information belongs becomes particularly pertinent 
in this kind of situation. However, as mentioned above, this kind of situation might 
also arise between other family members, or adult children and their parents, and thus 
is not an issue uniquely related to minors: as such it will not be discussed further here.
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Even if a health professional did not refuse to disclose information about familial 
genetic risk to a minor on the basis of section 29(1)(a), might the minor be refused 
access to such information on one of the other grounds in the Act?
2.1.9  Sections 29(1)(c) or (d) of the Privacy Act
The HIPC Commentary gives the following guidance to health professionals in respect 
of refusing to disclose health information to a minor under the age of sixteen years:
Individuals,	 whatever	 their	 ages,	 are	 entitled	 to	 access	 their	 personal	 health	
information.	 If	 releasing	 information	 to	 an	 individual	 under	 16	 would	 be	
contrary	to	that	person’s	interests,	consider	whether	all	of	the	information	must	
be	withheld,	 or	whether	part	 of	 it	 could	be	 released	without	prejudicing	 their	
interests.	It	may	be	possible	to	release	part	of	the	information,	or	to	summarise	or	
rephrase	it	so	that	its	release	would	not	be	as	prejudicial.
Dawson comments in respect of section 29(1)(c) that: 
To	 permit	 information	 to	 be	 withheld	 on	 this	 ground	 the	 likely	 prejudice	 to	
the	 individual’s	health	should	be	so	significant	and	probable	 that	 it	outweighs	
their	usual	right	to	obtain	information	about	their	health.	…	But	there	is	not	




A similar threshold is arguably also required when refusing a minor’s request for 
access to health information pursuant to section 29(1)(d) of the Privacy Act 1993: 
certainly the same rationale, in terms of limited evidence of harm and the benefits 
of open communication, is applicable The standard for refusing to disclose is lower, 
and less clear, in respect of those under sixteen years of age, than that for others: 
disclosure may be refused if such is merely against the minor’s ‘interests,’ and not just 
if it is likely to prejudice physical or mental health. The threshold for withholding 
health information from minors on this basis may be considered a paternalistic 
anachronism and becomes less justifiable the older they become. 
If a minor is competent to make health-care decisions, which may be the case if the 
minor is in a position to ask for health information, then the Gillick	principle, the 
Code of Rights, UNCROC, the Privacy Act 1993 and HIPC, all of which emphasise 
respect for the autonomy of competent individuals, support the right to access health 
information. If a minor under the age of sixteen needs to access the information in 
order to make an informed medical decision, and is competent to do so, then the 
minor must be given all of the relevant information necessary to make that decision 
(right 6, Code of Rights). 
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If a minor were too young to play any part in health-care decisions, then it is difficult 
to envisage the minor seeking to access information. In the rare cases in which such a 
situation might arise, the health professional must still consider the minor’s rights as a 
health and disability services consumer under the Code of Rights, and under article 12 of 
UNCROC, in particular; as well as considering the general thrust of privacy regulation 
which emphasises the rights of individuals to their own health information. 
Would information that a minor was at increased risk of suffering a heritable genetic 
mutation be against the minor’s interests? The answer to this question will depend 
upon the specific circumstances of the case. If the minor were at increased risk for a 
condition like FAP, then it would usually be in the minor’s interests to know, given 
that surveillance and early detection can prevent or minimise much of the potential 
harm that may arise from the mutation. If the minor were at increased risk for HD, 
because a parent had tested positive for the HD mutation, then arguably it may 
not be in the minor’s interests to know, given that the condition is late onset, and 
untreatable. However, studies on informing children of genetic risk, and the benefits 
and harms of genetic testing of minors considered earlier, indicate that there is so 
much more to perceptions of risk and harm than merely whether or not a condition 
is early or late onset, or treatable or non-treatable. The individual’s personal strength 
and family situation will usually be very relevant. Perhaps if a minor is having to seek 
information about genetic risk status from a health professional, without the consent 
of the parents, then the minor may not be in a very supportive environment and 
the health professional will need to take this into account when deciding whether to 
refuse to disclose any increased genetic risk pursuant to section 29(1)(d) (particularly 
as a person’s mood before genetic testing, and their family environment, seem to play 
an important part in predicting their reaction to their genetic risk status).
Even if a minor were not refused access to information about genetic risk status, on 
the basis of one of the exceptions considered earlier, how would the minor know 
to seek access to any such information if the parents had not disclosed the fact of a 
familial heritable illness?
2.2  Disclosure from parents
2.2.1  Do parents have a legal obligation to inform their children that they are at risk for  
 a heritable genetic condition?
Parents are not agencies covered by the Privacy Act 1993 or the HIPC: they are not 
similarly obliged to provide their children with all relevant information held about 
them. If parents do not tell their children of genetic risk in their family, then minors 
are in a vulnerable position (as health professionals appear to have no duty and 
probably no discretion to tell them either, without consent). 
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In the main, because of the high value placed on autonomy in New Zealand generally, 
and particularly in our medico-legal system, others are not entitled to know about a 
family member’s genetic risk status, or genetic condition, even where such knowledge 
would yield information about their own health. However, parents have far greater 
legal duties and responsibilities in relation to their children than people or family 
members have to each other generally. If parents (knowingly or recklessly) did not 
inform a child of her increased genetic risk status, when a failure to do so could result 
in serious harm or even death could they be held criminally responsible?
2.2.2  Section 152 of the Crimes Act 1961: Failing to provide the necessaries
Crimes Act 1961







The necessaries of life include medical care, and it is clear that if parents failed to 
seek life-saving treatment for a minor under the age of sixteen years they could be 
held criminally responsible for failing to provide the necessaries of life.15 Increased 
risk for a childhood or early onset disorder might threaten a minor’s health or life. In 
this case the parents would more likely be held responsible (if at all) for not seeking a 
potentially life-saving test (and the necessary sequelae) for the minor, rather than for 
not informing their child of the increased risk and leaving it up to the child to seek 
testing if so desired, because they are generally responsible for their child’s well-being 
and life until the age of sixteen (evidenced by the duty to provide the necessaries of 
life to those under the age of sixteen).16 
An omission to inform an asymptomatic minor of a heritable genetic mutation for 
a late-onset condition may endanger health or life later in adult life but section 152 
of the Crimes Act does not apply to these circumstances; it aims to protect minors 
under the age of sixteen. Section 152 would also not apply to a failure to disclose 
increased risk for carrier status, or a failure to disclose increased risk to an untreatable 
late-onset disorder, as in neither case would the minor’s life or health be endangered 
by the omission. 
2.2.3  Section 145 of the Crimes Act 1961: Criminal nuisance
The Court of Appeal noted in R	v	Lunt	that there is a common law duty on parents to 
protect their children from harm, which may extend further than simply providing the 
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necessaries of life. Blanchard J stated that ‘a parent’s common law duty is undoubted’, 
citing Russell	on	Crime (12th ed.) London: Stevens & Sons, 1964, pp 402–3: 
…	parents	are	under	a	legal	duty	to	take	all	reasonable	steps	within	their	power	
to	 preserve	 the	 lives	 of	 their	 children	 and	 this	 responsibility	 attaches	 to	 them	
automatically	by	virtue	of	their	parenthood.17
On this basis, it is arguable that parents could be held liable in criminal nuisance, 
pursuant to section 145 of the Crimes Act, for omitting to discharge their common 
law legal duty to ‘take all reasonable steps within their power to preserve the lives 
of their children’, if they failed to inform them that they were at increased risk for a 
heritable genetic mutation.18 





The phrase ‘any legal duty’ has been interpreted to include ‘uncodified duties 
recognized by the common law’.19 However, there are a number of problems with 
arguing that a parental failure to inform a minor of her increased genetic risk would 
result in a criminal nuisance pursuant to section 145 of the Crimes Act.
The exact scope of a common law parental duty to preserve the lives of children 
needs to be defined. It is unclear whether a duty to inform one’s child of increased 
risk for a heritable genetic mutation would even fall under a common law duty to 
‘preserve the life’ of one’s child. There is the undeniable competing interest of the 
parent’s own health information privacy, an interest which may not be present or 
as compelling in other life-preserving situations. A number of other factors might 
also be relevant – not least, whether medical interventions would be available, 
upon receipt of the information regarding one’s increased risk, that could reduce or 
eliminate the likelihood of harm. 
Regardless, any common law duty of parents to ‘take all reasonable steps within their 
power to preserve the lives of their children’ would almost certainly extinguish when 
guardianship ends (eighteen years, section 28, Care of Children Act 2004), or earlier. 
The duty may end at the age of sixteen in New Zealand, given that sixteen is the 
age at which the statutory duty to provide the necessaries of life ceases; minors can 
give their own consent to or refusal to consent to medical treatment (section 36(1), 
COCA 2004); and minors can challenge their parents or guardians’ decision in Court 
(section 46, COCA 2004). Thus the threat of a criminal sanction pursuant to section 
145 of the Crimes Act could not be relied upon to encourage parents to inform their 
children of their increased risk for a late-onset disorder.
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Therefore, even if a common law duty of ‘preservation of life’ that included a 
responsibility to inform children of any increased genetic risks did attach to parents, 
it is unlikely that such a duty would survive past the child’s sixteenth or eighteenth 
birthday (meaning it would generally not cover disclosure of increased risk to late-
onset disorders). Additionally, to be liable, the parents would have to know that 
omitting to inform their children of their increased risk ‘would endanger … the life, 
safety, or health’ of their children. This criterion would not be met in respect of failing 
to inform a minor of increased risk for carrier status, which does not threaten life, 
safety or health. It would also not be met by failing to inform a minor of increased 
risk for an unpreventable and untreatable disorder. 
Are there any other legal duties incumbent upon parents that might include a duty to 
inform their children of a heritable genetic mutation in the family? 
2.2.4  Section 156 of the Crimes Act 1961: Duty of people in charge of dangerous things
The case of R	v	Mwai20 involved a man charged with criminal nuisance (pursuant to 
section 145, Crimes Act) as a result of having unprotected sex with women without 
disclosing that he had HIV. He was found to be in charge of a dangerous thing (seminal 
fluid carrying HIV) in respect of which he had a legal duty to take reasonable care to 
avoid endangering human life, pursuant to section 156 of the Crimes Act. 
 156. Duty of persons in charge of dangerous things – 
 Every one who has in his charge or under his control anything whatever, 
whether animate or inanimate, or who erects, makes, operates, or maintains 
anything whatever, which, in the absence of precaution or care, may endanger 
human life is under a legal duty to take reasonable precautions against and to 
use reasonable care to avoid such danger, and is criminally responsible for the 
consequences of omitting without lawful excuse to discharge that duty. 
Hardie Boys J stated that ‘the expression “anything whatever”, coupled with the 
adjectives “animate or inanimate”, is one of deliberately wide import.’21 He referred 
to the Court of Appeal’s decision in the case of R	v	Turner:22
The	section	has	long	been	construed	as	including	things	that	are	not	inherently	
dangerous	 but	 are	 dangerous	 if	 operated	 without	 reasonable	 care.	 …	 It	 is	
difficult,	 and	 indeed	 unnecessary,	 to	 disassociate	 a	 thing	 from	 its	 use.	 So	 the	
section	 contemplates	 both	 a	 thing	 inherently	 dangerous	 in	 its	 static	 condition	
or	 a	 thing	 dangerous	 in	 the	 course	 of	 its	 operation.	 …	 The	 phrase	 ‘anything	
whatever’	has,	in	our	view,	been	deliberately	chosen	as	a	phrase	of	wide	import.	
This	is	emphasised	by	‘whatever’.	The	only	qualification	to	the	phrase	is	that	to	
be	 within	 the	 section	 it	 must	 be	 ‘anything	whatever’	 which,	 in	 the	 absence	 of	
precaution	or	care,	‘may	endanger	human	life’.23
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The word ‘endanger’ in sections 145 and 156 means to ‘put in peril of something 
untoward’ (per Tompkins J in R	v	Turner24). The Court held in R	v	Turner that it was 
not necessary for the prosecution to prove that danger to life was actually caused as a 
result of a breach of the duty. It was sufficient to prove that the acts or omissions put 
an individual or a member of the public in peril or at risk.25 
In respect of the causal connection between the person’s act or omission and the 







A decade later, Dalley was charged with breaching section 145 of the Crimes Act 
because he failed in his legal duty to inform a woman, with whom he had had 
protected sex, that he had HIV.27 The Police argued that despite the condom use the 
defendant had an obligation	to	disclose that he had HIV: he should not have exposed 
the woman to any risk that she had not accepted.
The Judge found that Dalley was in control of a dangerous thing (again, seminal 
fluid carrying HIV) and that he did have a legal duty to take reasonable precautions 
so as not to endanger human life. However, Judge Thomas considered that while 
most people would want to be told that a potential sexual partner was HIV-positive, 
and that there may be a moral duty to disclose that information, there is a difference 
between a moral duty and a legal duty. The legal duty in this case was to take 
reasonable precautions against, and use reasonable care to avoid, transmitting the 
HIV virus (para 43). 




The	duty	under	 s	156	 is	 to	use	 ‘reasonable’	precautions	and	 care.	The	duty	 is	
not	 to	 take	 fail-safe	 precautions.	 Reasonableness	 is	 an	 objective	 standard.	 On	
the	basis	 of	 the	 evidence,	 I	find	 that	 in	 the	 circumstances	Mr	Dalley	did	 take	
reasonable	precautions	and	care.29
The Judge ruled that there did not have to be a significant risk of harm for the duty 
to take reasonable precautions to apply.
7
The	 words	 of	 s	 156	 are	 clear.	 Where	 anyone	 has	 under	 his	 charge	 or	 control	
anything	 which,	 in	 the	 absence	 of	 precaution	 or	 care,	 ‘may	 endanger	 human	
life’	he	is	under	a	legal	duty	to	take	reasonable	precautions	against	and	to	use	
reasonable	 care	 to	 avoid	 such	 danger.	 There	 is	 nothing	 in	 those	 words	 which	
implies	that	there	must	be	a	significant	risk	of	the	danger.30
2.2.5  Could the section 156 duty in respect of dangerous things apply to parents who  
 omitted to provide their children with information about a heritable genetic   
 mutation in the family? 
Whether parents could be considered to have a legal duty in respect of a dangerous 
thing, which they might be at risk of breaching if they did not inform their children of 
their increased genetic risk (due to a heritable genetic mutation in the family) would 
depend on a number of factors: whether information about a person’s genetic risk 
status could be considered a ‘dangerous thing’; whether parents could be said to be 
‘in charge’ of the genetic information; whether parents omit to take reasonable care 
against or use reasonable care to avoid danger to human life; whether parents know 
that omitting to inform their children of increased genetic risk could endanger the life 
or health of their children; and whether they have a lawful excuse for the omission. 
Section 156 explicitly applies a duty of care to persons in charge of ‘anything 
whatever, whether animate or inanimate’ that may endanger human life. It is unlikely 
that information that a person is at risk for a heritable genetic mutation would be 
covered by this section, primarily because while awareness of the information could 
potentially help to save or prolong a human life (by allowing for prophylaxis or 
early detection and intervention where such was available), the information itself 
cannot endanger human life, which is the only qualification on the deliberately wide 
choice of words. It is the genetic mutation that endangers life, not the information. 
Consider R	v	Mwai	in which it was the seminal fluid containing the HIV that was the 
‘dangerous’ thing’ and not Mwai’s knowledge and non-disclosure of his HIV. And 
whilst the parents could be argued to be in charge of the information, it does not 
make sense to speak of their being in charge of the genetic mutation.31 
For the sake of argument, if information that a person was at risk for a heritable 
genetic mutation were classed as a ‘dangerous thing’ for the purposes of section 
156, there would be no need for actual harm to be caused in order for the duty to 
be breached. Thus even if the person never developed the disorder that they were 
at risk for (whether because the condition was not fully penetrant or the person 
prematurely died) the duty may still have been breached by a failure to inform. And 
while the cases of R	v	Mwai	and Police	v	Dalley highlight that there can be different 
means of taking reasonable precautions in respect of a dangerous thing – in the case 
of HIV, wearing a condom, or informing potential sexual partners of one’s HIV status 
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– the only step that can be taken to reduce the danger to human life when a person is 
at risk for a heritable genetic disorder is to inform the individual at risk of the risk, so 
that the individual can take whatever preventive measures are available, and be alert 
for symptoms in order to begin any available treatment as soon as possible. 
There is also a knowledge requirement in section 145 of the Crimes Act 1961. So, still 
assuming that information that a person was at risk for a heritable genetic mutation 
could be classified as a ‘dangerous thing,’ parents would have to know that omitting 
to take care with the genetic information (ostensibly by way of informing their child 
of her risk status) ‘would endanger … the life, safety, or health’ of the child. Parents 
might know that not informing a minor that the minor is at risk for the FAP or 
BRCA1 mutation, for example, would endanger health and life (assuming that they 
had been appropriately informed of the heritable nature of the genetic mutation 
that they were affected by or carrying). However, it would not make sense to speak 
of parents knowing that a failure to inform a child of the risk of being a carrier or of 
developing an unpreventable and untreatable disorder would endanger her health 
or life: because it would not. Carrier status does not endanger one’s own life, and 
nothing could be done to avoid the danger to health caused by an untreatable late-
onset disorder. 
The clumsiness of applying the duty to various genetic testing scenarios reinforces 
the view that information that one is at risk of a heritable genetic mutation is not a 
‘dangerous thing’ for the purposes of section 156 of the Crimes Act. The heritable 
genetic mutation is the dangerous thing, and parents are not in control of the 
mutation. They would also presumably have the lawful excuse of protecting their 
own health information privacy.
The section 156 legal duty of care in respect of ‘dangerous’ things does not appear 
to apply to information that an individual is at risk for a heritable genetic mutation. 
Parents are not compelled by this section to inform their children of their risk status. 
Are there any other potential legal duties parents might be subject to in respect of 
informing their children that they are at risk for a heritable genetic mutation? 
2.2.6  Section 157 of the Crimes Act 1961: Duty to avoid omissions dangerous to life
Section 157 of the Crimes Act places a duty on people to avoid omissions dangerous 
to life: 





Prima	 facie, the terminology of this provision fits better with the scenario under 
discussion: A parent may undertake	 to	 do	 any	 act – e.g. impart information – the	
omission	 to	 do	 which	 is	 or	 may	 be	 dangerous	 to	 life – an omission to impart the 
information may be dangerous to life e.g. if a person is not told that they are at risk 
for a heritable genetic mutation for which there are risk-reducing initiatives available 
(e.g. FAP or BRCA1). 
However, there obviously needs to be a specific ‘undertaking’ to impart the 
information. Such an undertaking can be implied or explicit,32 although it is unlikely 
that the undertaking parents implicitly make to protect their children would suffice, 
particularly as parental legal obligations to children are covered by section 152 of the 




Perhaps if parents made an undertaking with their health professional that they 
would inform their child by a certain time of the risk of a heritable genetic mutation, 
and that there was genetic testing available, the legal duty in section 157 would arise. 
However, consider the implications: how would the health professional know whether 
the parents had abided by the undertaking (without risking breaking confidentiality 
to find out)? What action would the health professional take if the parents breached 
the undertaking? He or she would still be subject to privacy regulation and the duty 
of confidentiality owed to the parent(s); the only recourse would appear to be going 
to the Police to report the breach of undertaking. 
However, the health professional would still be bound by the confidentiality he or she 
owes to the parents not to disclose their health information without their consent, 
unless there was a ‘serious’ and ‘imminent’ threat to the health of another. This 
threshold would not be met in the case of a minor being at risk for carrier status or 
an untreatable disorder, and the ‘imminence’ test is also unlikely to be met in the case 
of increased risk for a late-onset disorder for which there is prophylaxis or treatment 
available (see discussion earlier). 
Notwithstanding, approaching the Police about a breached undertaking which may 
endanger human life is not the most conciliatory way to work with the family to help 
them inform their child of her increased risk, and may well damage the relationship 
irreparably. 
Moreover, one can only be criminally responsible for breaching the duty to avoid 
omissions dangerous to life, when one has breached the duty ‘without lawful excuse’. 
Parents who breached an undertaking to inform their children of a heritable genetic 
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mutation in the family might argue that they had a lawful excuse – protecting their 
own health information privacy.
Thus, section 157 of the Crimes Act does not appear to apply to the situation where 
parents do not inform their children of their increased risk to a heritable genetic 
mutation. 
Additionally, persons are only criminally responsible for the consequences of omitting 
to discharge one of the legal duties discussed ‘if, in the circumstances of the particular 
case, the omission or neglect is a major departure from the standard of care expected 
of a reasonable person to whom that legal duty applies in those circumstances’ 
(section 150A, Crimes Act 1961). Thus in either of these scenarios (suggested by 
sections 156 and 157 of the Crimes Act) successful prosecution would require proof 
that the parents’ omission to inform their child of the heritable genetic mutation 
in the family was a major departure from the standard of care reasonably expected. 
Genetic testing, and predictive genetic testing in particular, is relatively new: it is 
unclear whether a parent’s failure to inform the children of their increased risk of a 
heritable genetic mutation would be classified as a major departure from the standard 
of care expected of a reasonable person with that duty, in those circumstances. This 
may very well depend upon the type and level of risk involved and the opportunity 
for interventions. 
Note that while an omission to discharge a legal duty could result in criminal nuisance 
if the person knew that an individual’s life, safety or health would be threatened 
by the omission (section 145, Crimes Act), such an omission could also potentially 
result in culpable homicide if a person died as a result of such an omission (section 
160(2)(b), Crimes Act). The intricacies of establishing a culpable homicide charge 
cannot be outlined in this report. Suffice to say that even if, pursuant to the Crimes 
Act, parents could be said to have a legal duty to inform their children of a heritable 
genetic mutation in the family for which there is prophylaxis or treatment available, 
it is very improbable that the causal nexus of an omission to inform and the death of 
the child would be sufficient to constitute culpable homicide.34 
Thus, while parents may be under a moral duty to inform their children of heritable 
genetic mutations when their children are adults; when there is no likelihood of 
serious harm or risk to life or, notwithstanding, there are no useful interventions 
available; or when the condition is late onset, there do not appear to be any legally 
recognisable duties requiring this type of disclosure (except where such is necessary 
to prevent permanent injury to the health of or save the life of a minor under the age 
of sixteen, section 152 Crimes Act 1961).
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2.  studies on informing children of heritable genetic mutations
…	we	often	do	not	know	what	risk	 information	gets	discussed,	 the	manner	 in	
which	 these	 conversations	 take	 place,	 or	 the	 impact	 they	 may	 have	 on	 family	
members’	feelings,	thoughts,	and	health	behaviors.35	
Parents are naturally distressed by knowledge that their children are at risk for a 
heritable genetic mutation, and may want to delay telling them as long as possible. 
Several surveys have catalogued attitudes as to the appropriate age at which parents 
should inform their children that they are at risk for a heritable genetic mutation. 
Some may prefer never to tell. Others prefer to introduce the child or adolescent 
to the issues gradually, over a period of years. Some want to tell their children of 
their genetic risk status before they become sexually active, so that they can make 
informed contraceptive and reproductive choices. Conversely, some want to avoid 
telling their children at puberty, which is viewed as a time of life that is tumultuous 
enough as it is. 
2.3.1  Attitudes
Whitelaw et al.36 surveyed sixty-two people with the FAP mutation as to their views 
on the most suitable age at which to inform children about the FAP risk in the family. 
Of the fifty-one participants who responded to the question, twenty indicated that 
ten years of age was appropriate. A further thirteen suggested that between the ages 
of thirteen and fourteen was the most suitable time. Just three respondents thought 
that a child should be informed below the age of ten, and one thought that the 
information should be deferred until the child was over fourteen. The remainder 
indicated a suitable age somewhere between eleven and fourteen.37
There	 was	 a	 widespread	 feeling	 among	 the	 interviewees	 that	 children	 should	






Rosen et al. surveyed paediatric residents as to their attitudes towards dealing with 
the familial risk raised by a four-year-old boy presenting with Fragile X (among other 
clinical scenarios). Fragile X is an X-linked disorder, which generally means that only 
males fully express the disorder. Some female carriers of the Fragile X mutation can 
also be affected, but they are usually unaffected carriers. The vast majority of the 
residents (89 per cent) recognised the need to inform the boy’s sister of the heritable 
pattern of the disorder: 31 per cent indicating it would be appropriate to do so at the 
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girl’s current age of nine, and 86 per cent indicating it would be appropriate to do so 
by the teenage years.39 
Elger and Harding surveyed medical and law students from six Swiss universities 
about their attitudes in respect of genetic testing of minors. All the students 
received an introduction to fundamental issues of medical law and ethics, including 
a presentation on informed consent, competence and confidentiality. They also 
received some information about HD and watched a fifteen-minute video interview 
with a thirty-eight-year-old woman who had recently been diagnosed as suffering 
from HD. The video informed the students that the woman had two sons aged ten 
and sixteen and that she was adamant that she did not want them told about or tested 
for HD at the moment.
Three quarters (75 per cent) of the medical and law students thought that the sixteen-
year-old son should be informed of his mother’s HD, despite her wishes; and 91 per 
cent indicated that he should have the chance to be undergo predictive testing for HD 
if he wanted.40 Most of the comments in respect of whether or not the sixteen-year-
old son should be informed of the mother’s HD were to qualify agreement with the 
statement. For example, ‘the question needs to be discussed with parents’, and ‘inform 
if the adolescent is sufficiently mature’. Some students, particularly medical students, 
were concerned about the psychosocial harm that might result from informing the 
adolescent. Those opposed to informing the adolescent raised related concerns: it is 
the parents’ decision to inform; the adolescent is not mature enough to be informed; 
and psychosocial harms might result from informing him.41 
2.3.2  Experience
Hallowell et al. noted that existing research on genetic risk disclosure within families 
indicated that few parents disputed the need to disclose risk information, but that they 
often found it burdensome (in terms of to whom, how, when and what to disclose). 
Biologically and emotionally close relatives were more likely to be informed of a 
hereditary risk than other relatives.42 
Hallowell et al. interviewed seventeen men (five carriers, twelve non-carriers) who 
had been tested for a BRCA1/2 mutation in relation to communicating with their 
children about genetic testing. They also interviewed eight partners of the men (of 
three carriers, five non-carriers), and four daughters of non-carriers. The parents 
saw it as their responsibility to inform their children that they were undergoing 
genetic testing and of the results, rather than the health professional’s responsibility. 
They wanted to deliberately manage the timing and content of the information 
disclosed.43
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In choosing a communication strategy, they weighed up their children’s rights to 
know about the hereditary risk, versus their own need to protect their children from 
anxiety-provoking information (roughly, half of the children were minors, and half 
were adult children). By the time of the interviews all parents had informed their 
children of the genetic testing undergone and the results, except for one solo father 
who wanted to tell his seventeen and nineteen-year-old children that he carried a 
BRCA mutation, but did not know how to explain it to them.44
Three different communication strategies were recorded, from the interviews: 
complete openness; limited disclosure; and total secrecy. Very few families were 
completely open with their children from the beginning regarding the fact of their 
father undergoing genetic testing for a BRCA mutation. None of the parents involved 
the children in the decision regarding whether or not to undergo testing, however, a 
few of the parents told their children that their father was undergoing testing as soon 
as the decision was made. The majority of the parents opted for limited disclosure: 
either making brief reference to or downplaying the testing before the father was 
tested, or not informing their children until after the father had received his test 
results. A small group of parents kept the father’s involvement in testing a closely 
guarded secret, until after the fact (and indeed one father, mentioned earlier, had not 
informed his children of his result either).45 
The age of the children played a part in the choice of communication strategy: 
those families with children under the age of eighteen were more likely to opt for 
limited disclosure about the implications of a mutation positive result or keep 
the father’s involvement in testing a secret. However, some parents also opted for 
limited disclosure in respect of adult children, particularly where their children were 
emotionally fragile or in more vulnerable circumstances (such as pregnancy).46 
Two of the fathers felt that their chosen strategy had been problematic. One father 
who was completely open indicated that as a result the whole family was very anxious 
whilst awaiting the results. Another father, who had kept the testing completely 
secret, expressed regret because he now did not know how to inform his children of 
his carrier status. 47
Likewise, parental attempts to limit disclosure or maintain secrecy were not always 
appreciated by their children. Children who were unaware of any hereditary risk 
were shocked when their fathers informed them that he carried a BRCA mutation. 
Some children expressed resentment and felt that they should have been informed 
before their father underwent testing, one claiming that ‘her parents’ secrecy had 
compromised her ability to control knowledge about her risk status’. Other children 
were unsure about the meaning of the test results, and some of the daughters of non-







it	did	not	appear	 to	have	affected	disclosure	per	 se.	This	 observation	 supports	




is	 difficult	 to	 draw	 conclusions	 about	 the	 effect	 of	 children’s	 age	 on	 disclosure	
patterns.49	
Hallowell et al. concluded with some implications for clinical practice: solo parents 
and their children might need more support through the genetic testing and 
counselling process; parents needed to be encouraged to think about what their 
children’s disclosure preferences might be; and adult children (particularly children 
of non-carriers) might receive incomplete information about the implications of 
genetic test results.50
Skirton conducted a study with fifteen individuals from families affected by HD: 
twelve parents with adolescent or young adult children at risk for HD, and three 
adults at risk for HD who had parents in the cohort.51
Families at risk for or with affected members with HD viewed the condition very 
negatively, feeling that it was a curse and that they could not envisage anything worse. 
Only one individual interviewed had heard of HD prior to a diagnosis being made 
in a close family member, indicating that communication was generally poor among 
family members (as subsequent enquiries frequently revealed other affected family 
members). Skirton suggests that the lack of communication partly contributed to the 
shock experienced by families when they received the diagnosis or heard the news. 
A period of mourning also followed diagnosis, focusing on loss of quality of life, of 
a personal future and of peace of mind. Some children also suffered the loss of the 
ability to depend upon a parent for warmth and security, ‘amounting almost to the 





All of the participants felt that parents should be the people to inform their children 
of the condition within the family. It was acknowledged that a lack of skill might 
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make this less feasible in some cases and that disclosure assistance and support for 





Only one of the twelve parents interviewed had formed an intention not to tell her 
children of their risk. Skirton suggests that for the other eleven parents, the belief that 
their children should know of their risk ‘was obviously a stronger force than the fear 
of telling’. The mother who did not intend to tell her daughters (who were all over 
eighteen) was the woman quoted earlier (at ‘Disclosure of familial genetic risk to a 
minor’) who acknowledged that she might be over-protective. One of her daughters 
was interviewed and expressed her frustration and anger that her mother was hiding 
and controlling information that should have been shared.55
All of the three ‘child’ participants stated that adults ought to be given information 
which may affect their future. Those who felt that information had been purposefully 
withheld from them were deeply resentful and angry and felt disempowered. 
Resentment was only enhanced by motives for delaying disclosure that included 
concern that children might not find an accepting partner or be able to have children: 
‘those at risk considered that future partners had every right to be aware of the genetic 
risks before making long-term commitment’.56
There was no consensus as to the best time to disclose genetic risks, with opinion 
as to the age at which children were mature enough and able to comprehend the 
information ranging from eight to eighteen. A number of participants indicated 
that it might be easier for a young person to absorb the news than an older person 
because of the distance of time between the person’s current age and the age at 
which they might become affected by the condition. Parents generally considered it 
important to inform the young person before they had children of their own, with 
some considering it necessary when their children became sexually active, and others 





The available evidence suggests that people tend to be in favour of informing their 
children of their genetic risks, and of informing them themselves, rather than via a 
health professional. It is, however, obviously a delicate and often difficult task, and 
the ages vary at which parents consider disclosure appropriate.
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2.  reasons to disclose genetic risks to minors
Analogous research from parents with HIV or AIDS reveal that reasons given not 
to disclose their status to their children included: the child’s perceived inability 
to understand information about HIV/AIDS; fear of a negative reaction (fear or 
sadness); and concern about feelings of rejection towards the parent. Reasons to 
disclose their status to their children included: not wanting their children to find out 
from someone else; and not wanting to keep family secrets. The parents who did not 
want to disclose their HIV status to their children reported more depression and less 
family cohesion.58
Factors affecting parental decisions to share personal medical information, including 
genetic test results, include: the characteristics of the illness; the child’s characteristics; 
and parental characteristics. Whether there are prophylactic or treatment strategies 
available for the parent (or child) may affect disclosure, as might the appearance of 
symptoms. Adolescents are usually given more information about family health risks 
than younger children, and parents may be more likely to disclose such information 
to children who are well-adjusted, rather than those with adjustment difficulties. 
Parents who exhibit greater distress post counselling are apparently more likely to 
disclose their test results to their children.59
The advantages of disclosure of genetic test results to children include: parental and 
child emotional relief, better ability to prepare for the future, and modelling of open 
communication behaviour. The disadvantages of not disclosing include: child anger 
at not being informed of the hereditary risk sooner; modelling of family secrets; and 
a mistaken belief that no familial health risks exist.60
The adolescent and young adult participants in Skirton’s study indicated that they 
had been aware of secrecy concerning the differences in an affected parent and the 
family as a whole, and the causes of those differences. 
…	 explanation	 of	 the	 reasons	 for	 the	 difficulties	 can	 help	 the	 child	 or	 young	
person	 to	 make	 sense	 of	 the	 situation	 and	 begin	 to	 adjust.	 It	 may	 be	 of	 some	
reassurance	to	parents	that	none	of	those	at	risk	felt	there	were	any	disadvantages	
to	being	told	the	truth.61
Skirton suggests that an individual’s adjustment to being at risk of a disease and 
‘renegotiation’ of the future may take place most successfully if the person is given 
time and support to work through ‘the renegotiation process’ at their own pace. One 
of the participants commented on the benefit of having time to adjust to her new 
risk status before adulthood, and compared her situation favourably against the 
difficulties faced by a friend who had not been informed until adulthood. The parents 
who had shared the news of the familial risk immediately with their teenagers also 
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reported that their children had seemed to cope well, possibly because the family 
could support each other and adjust to the news together.62 
Malpas argues that children should be informed of familial genetic risks because:63
• Informing children respects their developing autonomy and decision-making 
abilities.
• Not informing them until late adolescence or early adulthood might shatter 
the future that ‘they have begun to create and envisage for themselves’. Minors 
approaching adulthood will already have made some life plans, perhaps some 
career decisions, or they may have significant partners and be contemplating 
having children. 
• Younger children may more readily accept and adjust to the information.64 
• Keeping family secrets is harmful: ‘Long experience demonstrates that hiding 
information from children usually does not work and that efforts to keep secrets 
leave children feeling deceived and abandoned’. 65 Keeping information from 
children about their genetic risks exerts power over them and withholds power 
from them. 
• Informing children removes their uncertainty, particularly where family 
members are exhibiting signs of disease.
• Children are able to understand information about heritable genetic risks, and 
they are often aware of family tensions without necessarily knowing the cause. 
‘We simply cannot assume that children are not capable of understanding 
genetic knowledge or that they are better off not being told when they have 
experienced the consequences of genetic conditions within their families.’66
• Children benefit from knowing their biological origins and identity.67 
Where there is a serious genetic disorder within a family, children will often be more 
aware of it than adults may think. Clarke offers a useful analogy between handling 
genetic information about children and handling information about adoption.
Both	categories	of	information	are	likely	to	be	unwelcome	but	withholding	the	
information	 from	 the	 child	 for	 ever	 is	 likely	 to	 cause	 further	 problems.	 The	
practical	issue	becomes	how	best	to	impart	the	relevant	information….	Not	to	
mention	that	there	is	important	information	until	suddenly	broaching	the	topic	
















Minors may also be exposed to genetic information via the media, the internet, in 
school, or through family contact or involvement with a support group. 




Information about the existence or availability of genetic testing would also be 
instructive for the minor concerned about her genetic risk status. Research into 
the psychological and genetic counselling implications for adolescent daughters 
of mothers with breast cancer, found that less than a third of the daughters were 
aware of BRCA gene testing (compared to 82 per cent of the mothers), despite being 











Health professionals generally cannot inform a minor about a heritable genetic 
condition in the family without the permission of the person from whom the health 
information was gleaned (particularly without an explicit request for the information 
from an at-risk minor). And yet parents are under no legal duty to inform their 
children of heritable genetic conditions within their families for which they may be 
at risk.
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Whatever parents and guardians decide about informing their children of their 
genetic risks, the matter is currently unregulated. Parents can be advised by a health 
professional about an appropriate age and way in which to inform their children but 
families will make these decisions for themselves. 
The available evidence suggests that people tend to be in favour of informing their 
children of their genetic risks, and of informing them themselves, rather than via a 
health professional. It is, however, obviously a delicate and often difficult task, and 
the ages vary at which parents consider disclosure appropriate.
  Disclosure oF genetic test results to the minor testeD
Also problematic is the question of disclosure of genetic test results to a minor who 
has been tested on the basis of parental consent as a young child. 
.  Disclosure from health professionals 
The Code of Health and Disability Services Consumers’ Rights (the Code) states that 
all health consumers are entitled to all of the rights in the Code, commensurate with 
their competence (where this is relevant). Regardless of whether a child is able to give 
legally valid consent, the child must be informed by the health professional, to an 
extent commensurate with their potential to understand, of the purpose of any tests 
and	what	the	test	results	are (right 6(1)(f) and (g)). Where a child is tested as a baby 
or toddler this will be less feasible. 
Issues around health professional disclosure of a minor’s genetic test results to the 
minor may arise most often when a child has been tested for carrier status or for 
susceptibility to a late-onset condition. If a minor had been tested for a childhood 
or early onset condition, the minor will often have developed the disorder (or not, 
as the case may be) by the time it becomes clear that a genetic test may have been 
undertaken. 
Because the minor, in this case, has actually been tested, and is not simply seeking 
information about risk status on the basis of other family members’ health information, 
the concerns about privacy and confidentiality of others have less or no weight when 
a health professional is considering disclosing the minor’s own test results. The 
conceptual issue of whose health information familial genetic information actually 
is, is also less salient, given that a discrete set of health information exists in respect 
of the minor who has undergone genetic testing. 
The American Society of Human Genetics/American College of Medical Genetics 
Report Genetic	Testing	in	Children	and	Adolescents,	Points	to	Consider:	Ethical	Legal	
and	Psychosocial	Implications notes in particular that:
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of	 the	nondisclosure,	 the	 child’s	 interest	 in	 the	 information,	and	when	and	 in	
what	manner	the	results	should	be	disclosed.70
Health professionals can encourage parents to inform their children of their genetic 
test result, and where they refuse to do so health professionals will be subject to fewer 
constraints in informing the minor themselves (compared to those outlined in respect 
of informing minors of increased risk based solely on familial genetic information).
3.1.1  A duty to warn?
A duty to warn may more readily be accepted in the context of a health professional 
who knows, as a result of genetic testing performed on a person as an infant or young 
child (perhaps for the FAP or a BRCA mutation), that a person is at a greatly increased 
risk for developing cancer. There will be a very close degree of proximity between 
the ‘victim-plaintiff ’ and the health professional if the health professional continues 
to treat a tested minor on an individual basis as an adult. Policy considerations in 
this type of situation may tilt the balance in favour of imposing a duty: to inform a 
person of genetic testing undertaken as a child if	the results indicated a significantly 
increased risk of developing a condition for which there are risk or harm-reducing 
interventions available. 
Imposing such a duty of care would not be placing health professionals under ‘an 
indeterminate form of liability to an indeterminate class’.71 The class of person to 
whom such a duty would be owed would be discrete and clear: persons tested as 
children (on the basis of parental consent) for carrier status or increased risk for a 
late-onset disorder. 
The extent of the duty would be less clear if the health professional no longer saw or 
had any contact with the person tested as a child: would he or she have a duty to warn 
any such person of their carrier status or increased risk for developing a late-onset 
condition? 
In terms of predictability of harm arising: the likelihood of a person developing the 
condition, if they have the variation tested for, is certainly high in respect of some 
genetic variations e.g. those for HD, FAP, breast cancer (although note that BRCA 
penetrance is age-related). A positive carrier test would also mean that the person 
tested carried the mutation tested for (assuming the test results were interpretable and 
accurate) and was clearly at risk of passing the mutation on to any future offspring. 
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On the other hand, if a person tested positive as a child for an untreatable late-onset 
disorder, the public interest and policy considerations in favour of imposing a duty on 
health professionals to warn the person, as an adult, of their test result may diminish: 
there is nothing that the person tested or the health professional can do to minimise 
the likely harm. Additionally, as Dawson points out, liability for omissions, rather 
than actions, is less readily imposed.72 
A duty to warn people about genetic tests they had as children has not been imposed 
upon health professionals in New Zealand thus far: unsurprisingly, particularly given 
that only relatively recently have advances in technology allowed predictive tests to be 
undertaken. Whether or not such a duty should be imposed may be a question better 
left for legislators than the judiciary: this will be discussed further. 
.2  access to personal health information and disclosure exceptions
Minors are generally entitled to access any personal health information pursuant to 
rule 6 of the HIPC 1994. This right clearly extends to information such as genetic test 
results (see subclause 4(1), HIPC 1994).  
3.2.1  Section 29(1)(a) of the Privacy Act 1993
Disclosing a minor’s own genetic test results to her would not involve unwarranted 
disclosure of the affairs of another individual. The information is not mixed in this 
case, as it may arguably be in the case of shared familial genetic risk status. The minor’s 
test results relate specifically to the minor: no balancing of another individual’s rights 
or interests is required. 
However, might a minor be refused access to her own genetic test results pursuant to 
one of the other more applicable grounds in the Act?
3.2.2  Sections 2 (1)(c) or (d) of the Privacy Act 1993
In respect of section 29(1)(c), at least, access to personal health information should 
only be refused by a health professional where ‘the likely prejudice to the individual’s 
health’ is ‘so significant and probable that it outweighs their usual right to obtain 
information about their health’.73 
However, the standard for refusing to disclose is lower, and less clear, in respect of 
those under sixteen years of age than the standard in respect of others. Disclosure 
may be refused if such is merely against the minor’s ‘interests,’ and not just if it is 
likely to prejudice physical or mental health. However, the same rationale that applies 
to section 29(1)(c) should apply to section 29(1)(d) regardless of the difference in 
terminology: the likely prejudice to the minor’s interests should be so significant and 
probable that it outweighs the usual right to obtain health information. We have 
argued that a lower threshold for withholding personal health information from 
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minors may be considered a paternalistic anachronism and becomes less justifiable 
the older they become. Section 29(1)(c) should suffice in any case where serious 
concerns are held about the effect the information may have on the minor. 
But	there	is	not	much	evidence	that	providing	patients	with	access	to	their	medical	
records	 is	 likely	 to	 cause	 them	 harm.	 On	 the	 contrary,	 showing	 patients	 their	
records	is	now	recognised	as	a	useful	way	to	discuss	with	them	their	condition	
and	treatment,	and	a	good	way	to	keep	them	informed.74
Would learning the genetic test results be against a minor’s interests, or likely to 
prejudice physical or mental health? And to such an extent that the usual right to 
obtain personal information about health is outweighed? The answer to this question 
will depend upon the specific circumstances of the case. The benefits and harms of 
genetic testing of minors, including the benefits and harms raised by knowing that 
one is at increased risk for developing a disorder, or that one does not carry the 
heritable genetic mutation tested for, have been explored in great detail. 
If the minor has tested positive for something like the FAP mutation, then it would 
almost certainly be in her interests to know, given that surveillance and early 
detection can prevent or minimise much of the potential harm that may arise from 
the mutation.
If a minor tested negative for any genetic variation then it would be more difficult to 
argue that such information would be against the minor’s interests, or would prejudice 
physical or mental health. While negative effects have been recorded in respect of 
negative genetic test results, this is arguably less likely in the case of minors who have 
(given their youth) probably not spent the majority of their lives assuming that they 
had the disorder and consequently need to readjust to their new risk status. Survivor 
guilt may, however, be a possibility if one or more of the child’s siblings or a parent 
suffers from the heritable mutation. However, as with making a decision under many 
of the other privacy rules, the exercise becomes a balancing act: on balance would 
knowledge that one did not carry a heritable genetic mutation be likely to be more 
beneficial or prejudicial to the physical or mental health of the individual concerned? 
It would be a rare case in which a minor would benefit more from not knowing that 
he or she did not carry a heritable genetic mutation. 
If the minor had tested positive as a baby or a very young child for increased risk for 
a disorder such as HD, then arguably it may not be in the minor’s interests to know, 
and the information may well prejudice mental health, given that the condition is 
late onset, and untreatable. The putative psychosocial harms of such knowledge are 
a large part of the reason why all of the professional position statements outlined 
caution against testing minors for late-onset conditions, and particularly for those 
that are untreatable. 
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It may be argued by analogy from our arguments on the benefits and harms of testing 
in respect of competent minors seeking genetic testing, that the fact that the minor 
is seeking to access the test results indicates a belief that the information will be 
more beneficial than harmful (and in such a case it may very well be). Perhaps the 
minor who requests access to genetic tests results is prepared for any result. However, 
competence is of vital importance in this respect: a minor who would not be competent 
to give informed consent to the genetic testing, for which the minor now seeks results, 
may be denied access to the results if they would be likely to prejudice the minor’s 
interests or physical or mental health. The minor could not have chosen to undergo 
testing, because of the putative harms of such testing. However, if competent to make 
a decision about whether or not to undergo testing, then the minor should not be 
denied access to the test results (produced though they were on the basis of parental 
consent): given that the minor may make medical decisions. It would be nonsensical 
if a minor were considered competent to give informed consent to undergo testing 
and yet it were not considered prudent to pass on the results.
Additionally, it is not clear that the same benefits as those discussed earlier, in the 
context of competent minors who have requested genetic testing, would accrue to those 
who had been tested as a child, without a choice, on the basis of parental consent. 
The ‘right not to know’ is intimately related to the right not to be tested. If a minor 
(or an adult) does not want to know about an increased risk for a genetic mutation 
then surely it is much better not to have been tested at all, than to be given a choice 
whether or not to access test results having been given no choice about whether or 
not to be tested. If the minor has already been tested on the basis of parental consent 
then other people know highly sensitive information that the minor may not know, 
may not wish to know and presumably would not wish others to know. 
Whilst arguably the minor’s competence and autonomy is enhanced and respected 
in making the decision about whether to access the test result, the minor’s autonomy 
has already been infringed by testing without consent – there was no involvement in 
the original decision to elicit the information (by way of genetic testing). In effect the 
parents or health professional are saying, ‘Now that we have made the decision to find 
out this sensitive information about you, would you like to know the information 
too?’ This scenario may be considered more disempowering than empowering. 
And while the minor may want to know the test result once aware that it exists, the 
minor may very well resent the parents for having undertaken testing: even more so 
if given a mutation-positive test result. 
Studies on informing children of genetic risk, and the benefits and harms of genetic 
testing of minors, considered earlier, indicate that there is much more to perceptions 
of and actual risk and harm than merely looking at whether the condition tested for 
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is early or late onset, or treatable or non-treatable. The individual’s personal strength 
and family situation will usually be very relevant. As discussed earlier, perhaps if 
a minor is having to seek information about the genetic test result from a health 
professional, without the consent of parents, then the minor may not be in a very 
supportive environment and the health professional will need to take this into 
account when deciding whether to refuse to disclose test results pursuant to section 
29(1)(c) or (d).
3.2.3  Comments
Given the complexities, deciding whether or not to disclose a minor’s genetic test 
result is going to require a careful case-by-case approach. Genetic counselling will 
be necessary if a minor is to be told about a mutation-positive result, and may be 
necessary regardless of the test result. If a minor is aware of having been tested for 
a heritable genetic mutation but is denied access to the test results both by parents 
and health professionals (all of whom presumably know the results), one can only 
guess the psychological harm this could induce. The concerns raised by disclosing the 
information, coupled with the concerns raised by refusing to disclose the information, 
support the argument that carrier or predictive genetic testing that is not clinically 
indicated should generally be restricted to those who competently request it, and 
generally not be permitted on the basis of parental consent alone. 
Regardless of whether a minor is ultimately granted access to genetic tests results by 
the relevant health professional or agency, how would the minor know to seek access 
to her test results if her parents had not disclosed the fact that testing had taken place 
in the past? 
.  Disclosure from parents
Parents will generally be aware of a child’s genetic test results in accordance with the 
general law and policy relating to children and health privacy. The child’s results will 
provide information about the parents’ risk status (and paternity) too. Indeed, in 
most cases the parents will already be aware of their own genetic risk status because 
of the pattern of the heritable disorder within their family, which will often be the 
catalyst for testing a child. 
So do parents have a legal obligation to inform their children of the results of genetic 
testing that they underwent when they were younger? 
Parents are not agencies covered by the Privacy Act or the HIPC: they are not similarly 
obliged to provide their children with all relevant information held about them, or 
abide by the rules in respect of access to personal health information. 
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If parents do not tell their children that they underwent predictive genetic testing 
or carrier testing as a baby or very young child, minors are in a vulnerable position 
(as no duty to inform has yet been recognised in respect of health professionals 
who know of the test result). If parents do not inform their child of a genetic test 
then it is possible that the child may never find out (perhaps more so if the results 
were mutation negative), particularly if the family GP is not the same GP used as an 
adolescent or adult. 
Similar issues arise as those discussed earlier in the context of informing minors 
about existing familial genetic risks. If parents (knowingly or recklessly) did not 
inform a child of the genetic test result, when a failure to do so could result in serious 
harm or even death, could they be held criminally responsible?
Section 152 of the Crimes Act 1961 imposes a legal duty on parents to provide 
necessaries for any child under the age of sixteen and makes them criminally 
responsible for omitting without lawful excuse to do so, if the death of the child is 
caused or if life is endangered or health permanently injured, by such omission. 
The necessaries of life include medical care, and parents who fail to seek life-saving 
treatment for a minor under the age of sixteen can be held criminally responsible 
for failing to provide the necessaries.75 A mutation-positive genetic test result might 
indicate a threat to a minor’s health or life: but if that were the case then the parents 
would be more likely to be held responsible (if at all) for not seeking appropriate 
medical intervention as a result of the test result, rather than for not informing 
the minor of the result so that medical attention could be sought, because they are 
generally responsible for her well-being and life until she is sixteen years old. 
An omission to inform an asymptomatic minor of a mutation-positive genetic test 
result for a late-onset condition may endanger health or life later in adult life but 
section 152 does not apply to these circumstances; it aims to protect minors under 
the age of sixteen. Section 152 would also not apply to a failure to disclose carrier 
status, or a failure to disclose increased risk for an untreatable late-onset disorder, as 
in neither case would the minor’s life or health be endangered by the omission. 
Could parents be held liable in criminal nuisance on the basis of section 145 of the 
Crimes Act 1961 if they omitted to discharge their common law duty to ‘take all 
reasonable steps within their power to preserve the lives of their children’,76 by failing 
to inform them that they had tested positive for a mutation predisposing them to a 
condition, knowing that the omission would endanger their health or lives? 
As with section 152, any such liability under section 145 would more likely attach 
for omitting to seek treatment for the minor where this was necessary, rather than 
omitting to inform the minor of test results – particularly if the minor were not 
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competent to give informed consent to necessary procedures or treatment upon 
receipt of the test result. 
Even if a common law duty of ‘preservation of life’ that included a responsibility to 
inform children of genetic test results did attach to parents, it is unlikely that such a 
duty to preserve life would survive past the child’s sixteenth or eighteenth birthday 
(meaning it would generally not require disclosure to a minor of increased risk for 
late-onset disorders to a minor). Additionally, omitting to inform their child of a 
positive test result for carrier status or increased susceptibility to an unpreventable 
and untreatable	condition would not endanger life, safety, or health. 
Similar difficulties as those discussed, in respect of the duty of people in charge of 
dangerous things (section 156) and the duty to avoid omissions dangerous to life 
(section 157), arise in the context of parental failure to inform their child of a genetic 
test result. 
It is improbable that information about a child’s genetic test result would be covered 
by the duty of people in charge of dangerous things (section 156 of the Crimes Act 
1961), primarily because, while awareness of the information could potentially help 
to save or prolong a human life (by allowing for prophylaxis or early detection and 
intervention where such was available), the information itself cannot endanger 
human life, which is the only qualification on the deliberately wide choice of words. 
It is the genetic mutation that endangers life, not the information, and it does not 
make sense to speak of the parents being in charge of the genetic mutation.77 
Additionally, even if information about a genetic test result were included in the 
category of ‘dangerous things,’ a failure to inform a child of mutation-positive test 
results in respect of carrier	 status or an untreatable disorder would not endanger 
health or life. 
With respect to the duty to avoid omissions dangerous to life (section 157 of the 
Crimes Act 1961), an omission to impart a child’s genetic test result to the child 
may be dangerous to life; for example, if the child is not told about testing positive 
for increased susceptibility to a heritable genetic mutation for which there are risk-
reducing initiatives available (e.g. FAP or BRCA1). 
However, liability pursuant to section 157 requires a specific ‘undertaking’ to impart 
the information, being a genetic test result in this case. Perhaps if parents made an 
undertaking with their health professional that they would inform their child of 
the genetic test result by a certain time, the legal duty in section 157 might arise. 
However, how would the health professional know whether the parents had abided 
by the undertaking, and what action would he or she take if the parents breached the 
undertaking? He or she would still be subject to privacy regulation and the duty of 
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confidentiality owed to the parent(s); the only recourse would appear to be going to 
the Police to report the breach of undertaking. 
However, the health professional would still be bound by the confidentiality he or she 
owes to the parents not to disclose their health information without their consent, 
unless there was a ‘serious’ and ‘imminent’ threat to the health of another. This 
threshold would not be met in the case of a minor being at risk for carrier status or 
an untreatable disorder; and the ‘imminence’ test is also unlikely to be met in the case 
of increased risk for a late-onset disorder for which there is prophylaxis or treatment 
available (see discussion earlier). 
Additionally, persons are only criminally responsible for the consequences of 
omitting to discharge one of the legal duties discussed ‘if, in the circumstances of 
the particular case, the omission or neglect is a major departure from the standard 
of care expected of a reasonable person to whom that legal duty applies in those 
circumstances’ (section 150A, Crimes Act 1961). Thus in either of the scenarios 
(suggested by sections 156 and 157 of the Crimes Act) successful prosecution would 
require proof that the parents’ omission to inform their child of the genetic test result 
was a major departure from the standard of care reasonably expected. Genetic testing, 
and predictive genetic testing in particular, is relatively new: it is unclear whether a 
parent’s failure to inform the children of a genetic test result would be classified as a 
major departure from the standard of care expected of a reasonable person with that 
duty, in those circumstances. This would most likely depend upon the type and level 
of risk involved and the opportunity for interventions. 
A legal duty to inform one’s child of the results of any genetic testing undertaken as 
a child does not sit comfortably with any of the existing provisions in the Crimes 
Act 1961. This is unsurprising given that such a possibility would not have been 
envisaged by the draftsmen of the day. Parents do not appear to be legally obliged 
to inform their children of their genetic test results, although they may of course be 
legally criticised for failing to act on information that would seriously threaten their 
health or lives (section 152 Crimes Act 1961). 
In some cases, the test results may dictate the disclosure of the results. If the child 
tests negative for the heritable condition for which he or she was at risk, then it 
may be suitable to let the child know immediately to reassure the child, and then 
to reinforce the information at a later time when it will be retained as part of the 
medical history.78 
Equally, if the child tests positive to a symptomatic diagnostic test or develops an 
early or childhood-onset condition shortly after testing, then the child will know that 
their health is compromised, and should be told why and what the implications are, 
in ways and to an extent commensurate with understanding. Having hypothesised 
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that childhood cancer survivors who had learned of their diagnosis at an early 
stage would tend to be better adjusted at follow-up than those who learned they 
had cancer long after the diagnosis was made, Slavin et al. studied 116 survivors on 
average twelve years after diagnosis.79 They found that good psychological adjustment 
was associated with patients’ early knowledge of the diagnosis, and that many of 
the survivors, their parents and their siblings felt that a cancer diagnosis should be 
shared with a child early on. 
Even when test results are mutation negative (or perhaps mutation positive for a 
late-onset condition) parents may not want to inform their children for a variety 
of reasons ranging from paternity issues to concerns about the child’s capacity to 
absorb and adapt to the information. Professionals may share these concerns.
The issue is perhaps most complex when a child tests positive for a predictive or 
probabilistic late-onset condition for which there are few or no known effective 
medical interventions. Where a condition has no known medical prophylaxis or 
management then it would be difficult to argue that disclosure would be justified on 
the basis that it avoids harm or has an actual benefit for the child. 
Genetic counselling should explore all of these issues with parents and, where 
appropriate, children, to ensure that they are fully aware of the implications of genetic 
risks and genetic testing before any decisions are made. Counselling should also be 
available throughout and after the testing process.
.  studies regarding informing children of genetic test results
3.4.1  Attitudes
An international study of professionals involved in genetic testing revealed that 
United States and United Kingdom geneticists were reasonably evenly divided on 
whether to wait until a child reached the legal age of majority to tell him or her 
about genetic test results (compared with 73 per cent of United States primary	care	
physicians	favouring telling a child before the age of majority). Generally speaking, 
fewer of the parents than providers would tell children test results before the age of 
majority (54 per cent for familial hypercholesterolaemia, and 47 per cent for cancer 
susceptibility).80
Only a minority (41 per cent United States, 20 per cent United Kingdom) of the 
geneticists would tell a minor about a test result indicating predisposition to 
alcoholism before the age of majority, while the majority of primary-care physicians 
(68 per cent) would inform a minor before that time. Most geneticists would also not 
inform children of the results of HD or Alzheimer’s disease testing before the age of 
majority: just 12 per cent of United Kingdom geneticists would inform minors of 
either of the test results before majority, and amongst United States geneticists, just 
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20 per cent would inform a minor of an HD test result, and 18 per cent would inform 
about an Alzheimer’s disease test result before majority (compared to 44 per cent 
and 46 per cent of primary-care physicians for the respective disorders). Just under 
a third (31 per cent) of parents would inform a minor of Alzheimer’s disease results 
before majority, with 55 per cent deferring disclosing until majority, and 14 per cent 
indicating that they would never tell their child the test results.81
In a survey of attitudes of mothers of paediatric oncology patients, age was considered 
to be a determining factor regarding when mothers thought that healthy children 
should be told about (hypothetical) genetic cancer predisposition test results: 5 per 
cent favoured telling children under the age of seven years; 12 per cent would tell 
a child between seven and ten years; just over half (51 per cent) would tell a child 
between the ages of eleven and seventeen years; and a third (33 per cent) would not 
tell a child the test results until he or she was eighteen years old.82
3.4.2  Experience
Duncan’s international study of professionals involved in predictive genetic testing 
found that, of the eighteen children under the age of fourteen who had undergone 
predictive tests for non-medical reasons, only two had been informed of their test 
results: both had tested mutation negative for the disorders for which they were 
tested.83 There was some evidence of parental distress in three of the cases, which 
included anxiety about how and when to tell their child that they had tested positive 
for the HD or dystonia mutation.84
Jolly et al. interviewed people who had been carrier tested for balanced chromosomal 
translocations when they were young children. One of the young men tested was not 
informed of his carrier status until he was seventeen-years-old. He indicated that he 
would rather have been informed earlier ‘because it’s too much pressure on me now. 
I’d rather have had it over and done with at an earlier age’. Another young man said 
that he was glad that he had grown up with knowledge of his carrier status: ‘Because 
if for instance I found out about it at the age of sixteen, it would have come as a huge 
shock. It probably would have affected me more than it already had … I think by that 
age you probably have certain ideas and certain plans and then you realise this and 
it stops those plans’. Jolly et al. note that while it is important to keep the knowledge 
of the genetic risk ‘alive’ in the family, children do not need to be tested to be aware 
of the issues.85 
.  comments
A minor who is seeking access to genetic test results, rather than information about 
risk status on the basis of other family members’ health information, does not 
provoke the same the concerns for a health professional in respect of the privacy 
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and confidentiality of others. However, as with disclosing familial genetic risk, there 
currently exists no	legal	duty	to	warn a minor of her genetic test results. 
Minors might be refused access to their genetic tests results pursuant to sections 
29(1)(c) and 29(1)(d) of the Privacy Act 1993 if the information were considered 
prejudicial to their interests, or physical or mental health. Given the complexities, 
deciding whether or not to disclose a minor’s genetic test result will require a very 
careful case-by-case approach. Genetic counselling will be necessary if a minor is to 
be told about carrying a genetic mutation, and may be necessary regardless of the 
test result. If a minor is aware of having been tested for a heritable genetic mutation 
but is denied access to test results both by the parents and health professionals (all of 
whom presumably know the results), one can only guess the psychological harm this 
could induce. The concerns raised by disclosing the information, coupled with the 
concerns raised by refusing to disclose the information, support the argument that 
carrier or predictive genetic testing that is not clinically indicated should generally be 
restricted to those who competently request it, and generally not be permitted on the 
basis of parental consent alone. 
Parents do not appear to be legally obliged to inform their children of their own 
genetic test results: they are not covered by the Privacy Act 1993 or the HIPC or 
bound by any duties in the Crimes Act to inform their children of genetic test results, 
except where the results may seriously threaten their health or lives (section 152, 
Crimes Act 1961). 
  Discussion on Disclosure oF genetic risk status or   
 genetic test results to minors
We return to the questions posed at the beginning of this section: Should and, if 
so, when, how, what and by whom, minors be informed of their genetic risk status? 
These are difficult issues, and much of the relevant discourse will lie outside the 
mandate of legislators, regulators and policy-makers. 
The HGSA Policy on Predictive	 Testing	 in	 Children	 and	 Adolescents makes the 
following recommendation in terms of informing children of hereditary disorders 
in the family: 
Parents	should	be	encouraged	to	make	their	child	aware,	at	an	appropriate	age,	






In terms of disclosing actual test results, the more general HGSA Policy on 
Presymptomatic	and	Predictive	Testing	for	Genetic Disorders	states that: 
Where	 the	 risk	 status	 for	 a	 disorder	 has	 been	 established	 for	 a	 child,	 either	
prenatally	 or	 after	 birth,	 the	 child	 should	 be	 informed	 that	 the	 information	
will	 be	 available	 once	 he/she	 has	 reached	 a	 level	 of	 maturity	 consistent	 with	
understanding	its	implications.87
It is important that when information is disclosed to a minor about her genetic risk, 
it is given appropriately so that the minor fully understands the information and is 
not unduly frightened.88 Simply telling a young child that there is a heritable disorder 
within the family for which the child is at risk, and then never mentioning, discussing 
or developing the issue again, would not be of much benefit to the child. The message 







Malpas, Hallowell et al. and the evidence from studies involving parents with AIDS/
HIV emphasise the importance of ensuring that parents are fully informed and are 
fully supported in terms of their own genetic risks or test results, so that they can in 
turn inform and support their children.
In	 addition	 to	 managing	 their	 own	 emotional	 responses	 and	 considering	 the	
medical	implications	for	themselves,	parents	must	also	weigh	the	pros	and	cons	
of	communicating	this	information	to	their	children.90	
The findings of Skirton’s study confirm that the adjustment of the family is not 
necessarily a function of time, but ‘rather of the ability and willingness of the family 
members to “work through” the stages of grief … and to emerge with a personal 
model which allows them to invest in the future’.91
Families	who	considered	themselves	to	be	generally	‘loving	and	sharing’	felt	they	
utilized	these	attributes	 to	deal	with	the	 issues	which	arose	after	 the	diagnosis	
was	 made.	 Lyn,	 who	 felt	 her	 family	 was	 not	 ‘sharing’,	 seemed	 wistful	 at	 the	
opportunity	which	had	been	lost	by	the	withholding	of	news.	She	felt	frustrated	
that	 she	 had	 been	 denied	 the	 opportunity	 to	 make	 informed	 decisions	 and	 to	
support	her	parents	through	a	difficult	period.92	
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.  should there be a duty to disclose genetic risks to minors? 
…	 from	 a	 young	 age	 children	 should	 be	 advised	 of	 the	 risks	 associated	 with	
knowing	one’s	carrier	status,	even	though	the	actual	testing	is	postponed.	Next	





One of the purposes of the Human Assisted Reproductive Technology (HART) Act 
2004 is to establish a comprehensive information-keeping regime to ensure that 
people born from donated embryos or cells can find out about their genetic origins 
(section 3(f)). One of the HART Act’s principles is that donor offspring should be 
made aware of their genetic origins and be able to access information about those 
origins (section 4(e)). Section 50 of the HART Act 2004 provides for access by donor 
offspring to information about donors: information must be provided if requested.
The Act thus recognises the importance of people knowing about or being able 
to access genetic information that affects them. However, children born of donor 
embryos or cells are in a similar position to children who are unaware of their genetic 
risk status or genetic test results: they may never know that the genetic information is 
accessible if they are not informed of this fact by their parents or a health professional. 
The HART Act 2004 provides no mechanism for mandatory disclosure of their 
genetic origins to children born from donated embryos or cells, and no mechanism 
for mandatory disclosure of any preimplantation genetic test (PGD) results to the 
child tested.94 
Similarly, children who have been adopted can request access to their original birth 
certificates (pursuant to section 4 of the Adult Adoption Information Act 1985), but 
no one is obliged to inform them of the fact of their adoption. Adopted children are 
thus similarly vulnerable to the decisions of their guardians. 
Public health and policy considerations might favour some form of duty to inform 
children of the existence of their own genetic test results over a duty to inform children 
about their genetic origins. With regard to genetic test results, the information to be 
disclosed belongs solely to the child tested; it does not concern the identification 
of someone else who may not want to be identified, as may information about 
genetic origins. Additionally, in many cases the genetic test result information will 
have been identified as having potentially health or life-threatening consequences if 
undisclosed. 
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.2  who would be covered by a duty to disclose genetic risk? Parents? health   
 professionals?
The evidence reveals that most people think that parents should be the ones to inform 
their children about genetic risk. A parental duty to inform children would also be 
in line with the evidence considered in the ‘Benefits and harms’ section: a minor’s 
family environment, support networks and individual stability before testing seemed 
to be important predictors of the reaction to the result after testing. Similarly, an 
open and communicative family environment may reduce any psychological harm 
consequent upon a minor learning of increased risk for a heritable disorder. Learning 
of increased risk from her parents may be less traumatic than only discovering the 
status as a result of prising the information out of a health professional constrained 
by confidentiality obligations and privacy regulations. 
However, the degree of State intervention necessary to monitor and enforce a 
positive parental duty to impart genetic information to children may not be feasible 
or desirable. Punitive provisions for failure to disclose the information may seem 
extreme, but a lack of sanctions might give any such duty the appearance of being a 
toothless tiger.
However, we believe that there should be some means by which minors (or adults) can 
be informed of the fact that they underwent genetic testing as children, particularly 
where they are at increased risk for the disorder for which they were tested. 
.  recommendation
A register should be established to facilitate disclosure to persons who have reached 
the age of sixteen or eighteen (or earlier if they are competent and personally seek 
access to the information) of the fact that they underwent genetic testing as children. 
The information initially disclosed may inform the minor either that predictive or 
carrier testing was undertaken as a child, or that some information is available about 
genetic risk status should the minor wish to access it (if disclosure of the fact of having 
been tested is considered to be too much unsought information for the first contact). 
This notification could be achieved using a similar process as for notification of 
relatives about genetic testing for a familial disorder by the South Australian Familial 
Cancer Service (FCS).
As part of a study conducted by Suther et al.,95 participants with a heritable mutation 
predisposing them to cancer gave the FCS contact details of close relatives who might 
be similarly affected. 
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The	FCS	sent	a	letter	to	each	close	relative.	The	timing	of	this	letter	was	decided	
with	 the	proband	to	allow	 for	 informal	contact	with	relatives.	Some	probands	




the	 potential	 for	 adverse	 impact	 on	 the	 recipient’s	 insurability	 in	 Australia).	
…	South	Australian	relatives	who	sought	 further	 information	were	offered	an	
appointment;	 interstate	relatives	were	directed	to	 their	 local	 services.	The	FCS	
did	not	seek	further	contact	with	relatives	who	did	not	respond	to	the	letter	…	
(thereby	avoiding	the	risk	of	harassing	those	who	did	not	want	information).96	
Following is an excerpt from the letter sent by the FCS to relatives who might be at 
risk. A similar letter, imparting a similar degree of information (with the necessary 
changes, of course), could be utilised by a genetic test results register to disclose 
results to persons tested as children. 
I	am	writing	to	you	at	the	request	of	one	of	your	relatives	because	they	wish	to	
share	important	health	information	with	you.	…	A	member	of	your	family	has	
been	 found	 to	 have	 an	 inherited	 tendency	 to	 develop	 cancer.	 This	 may	 mean	
that	there	is	an	increased	chance	of	you	developing	cancer.	Even	if	people	have	
not	developed	cancer	themselves,	they	can	pass	this	inherited	tendency	to	their	
children.	 If	 a	 person	 has	 an	 increased	 chance	 of	 developing	 cancer,	 there	 are	
effective	ways	of	reducing	this	risk.







Advice to	 you	 and	 your	 doctor	 about	 managing	 your	 chance	 of	 developing	 	
cancer.	…
Please	let	us	know	if	you	would	like	to	find	out	more	about	the	services	available	
to	 you	 by	 indicating	 your	 response	 on	 the	 enclosed	 form	 and	 sending	 it	 back	
to	us.	These	services	are	available	at	no	cost	to	you.	Please	be	assured	that	the	
information	 we	 give	 you	 and	 any	 information	 we	 receive	 from	 you	 is	 treated	
confidentially.
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We urge you to take this matter seriously as	 this	 information	 can	 be	 life	
saving.97
We consider a genetic test results register established for this purpose to be the 
appropriate approach to ensuring that people who undergo testing as children are 
informed of the fact, because:
•	 It would encourage parents and health professionals to disclose test results to 
children – as the fact of testing will be disclosed to them anyway;
•	 It gives the person tested as a child the choice of whether or not to find out the 
information (assuming that he or she has not already been told); and
•	 It avoids the difficulties of imposing a new duty, which may have unwieldy and 
undesirable consequences in terms of monitoring, enforcement and sanctions.
The WHO Review	of	Ethical	Issues	in	Medical	Genetics	made a similar suggestion. 
It	should	not	be	assumed	that	parents	would	convey	full	and	accurate	information	
years	after	a	test	is	performed	(Fanos	and	Johnson,	1992.	Parents	have	an	ethical	
obligation	 to	 convey	 to	 children	 the	 results	 of	 such	 tests	 at	 such	 time	 that	 the	
child	can	understand	and	benefit	 from	the	 information.	Professionals	have	an	





Similarly, the United Kingdom CGS Working Party report on ‘The genetic testing of 
children’ proposed that:
Where	 testing	 may	 be	 of	 interest	 to	 the	 future	 adult,	 for	 health	 reasons	 or	 to	
permit	 informed	 reproductive	 decision	 making,	 the	 offer	 of	 counselling	 (and	
possible	testing)	should	be	made	once	the	person	is	mature	or	in	early	adult	life;	
this	may	require	the	establishment	of	an	active	genetic	register.99	
Genetic counselling services would be required to assist any minors contacted 
through this process, in deciding whether or not to access their test result, and to 
support them whatever their choice. 
And of course, the privacy of any such register and the information it contained 
would have to be strictly maintained.
We do not argue that a similar register be established to keep track of information 
about minors who are simply at increased risk for a heritable disorder but who have 
not been tested themselves. The issue of disclosure of familial genetic risk cannot 
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be resolved as neatly because it relates to all family relationships, and not just those 
between parents and their children. The implications are much wider than can be 
considered here. However, it is desirable that families do inform their children of 
familial genetic risks and let them make up their own minds about how to use the 
information (if genetic testing is not clinically indicated during childhood); health 
professionals should encourage parents to do this. 
  conFiDentiality anD Privacy
This section focuses on what kind of privacy protection a minor who is considering 
undergoing genetic testing, or one who has been tested on the basis of parental 
consent, might expect 
.  Parental access to their children’s health information
5.1.1  Disclosure one of the purposes for collection
While it has been argued that parents do not have an automatic right to information 
about their children, because the Privacy Act and HIPC (along with other rights-
based legislation) draw no real distinction in terms of their application to children 
and adults,100 health professionals are generally presumed entitled to disclose medical 
information to a child’s parents where they require the consent of the parent to the 
proposed treatment. It is important that parents are aware of their child’s condition 
and its medical implications so that they can be completely involved in the medical 
treatment: disclosure of the health information is one of the purposes for which it 
was collected, and is thus permitted under rule 11(1)(c) of the HIPC (although note 
that ‘facilitating informed consent does not necessarily involve disclosing the child’s 
entire medical records’).101
In cases where the need to disclose information is anticipated at the time of 
collection of the information, it is as well for practitioners to inform children or 
young people that disclosure is one of the purposes for which the information is 
being collected. For example, a child might be told that the information gained from 
a medical examination will be used for the purpose of gaining her parents’ consent 
to a procedure or treatment. ‘The Code does not require consent to be obtained for 
these anticipated disclosures: it is purpose-driven, not consent-driven.’102
The Code of Health and Disability Consumers’ Rights also gives parents who are 
consenting on behalf of their children rights: to effective communication; to be fully 
informed; and to make an informed choice and give informed consent. The right 
to be fully informed includes the right to information about the results of tests and 
procedures (right 6(1)(f) and (g)). 
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If parental consent is not required in order to advise or treat a child (e.g. a competent 
minor), then disclosure of information cannot be made to the parents on the basis 
that this was one of the purposes for which the information was collected, or on the 
basis of the rights given to consumers’ parents by the Code of Rights (as the parents 
are no longer ‘entitled to give consent on behalf of ’ the minor if a competent minor 
chooses to make personal medical decisions). This is discussed further later. 
5.1.2  Section 22F of the Health Act 1956: Disclosure and refusal to disclose
Section 22F of the Health Act 1956 requires information to be disclosed to 
representatives (a parent or guardian in respect of a child under the age of sixteen) 
on request. ‘The central aim of section 22F is therefore tolerably clear: to promote 
the sharing of information in order to assist ongoing treatment. … The apparent 
intention … is to deem someone who is legitimately seeking health information … 
for the purposes of further treatment, to stand in the shoes of that patient.’103 
However, there are grounds that health professionals can rely upon in order to 
withhold a child’s health information. Requests for information can be refused 
when there is a lawful excuse not to disclose, or when refusal is authorised under 
the Privacy Act or the HIPC. Rule 11(4) of the HIPC authorises the refusal of a 
representative’s request where: the disclosure of the information would be contrary 
to the minor’s interests (rule 11(4)(b)(i)); where the agency has reasonable grounds 
for believing that the minor does not or would not want the information disclosed 
(rule 11(4)(b)(ii)); or there would be good grounds for withholding the information 
under Part 4 of the Act if the request had been made by the individual concerned 
(rule 11(4)(b)(iii)).104
A classic example of disclosure of health information to parents being contrary to 
a minor’s interests (rule 11(4)(b)(i)) might arise where evidence of abuse has been 
discovered and it may not be in the minor’s interests, at that time at least, for such to 
be disclosed to the parents, who may be the abusers. There are many obvious examples 
of when a minor might not wish her parents to know her health information (rule 
11(4)(b)(ii)) in the sexual health field.
In the context of genetic testing most of the exceptions to disclosing pursuant to section 
22F of the Health Act 1956 are more applicable to competent minors, rather than 
minors who have been tested on the basis of parental consent. Otherwise, one might 
well question the rationale of undertaking genetic testing on the basis of parental 
consent, if the test results were not going to be disclosed to the parents (whether 
because such is deemed contrary to the minor’s interests, the minor does not want the 
results disclosed or for some other reason). If parents, who are charged with making 
medical decisions for their children not competent to make their own decisions, are not 
informed of and thus cannot act on the basis of the test results, the information may 
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stagnate, given that no one is in a position to give informed consent to any procedure 
or treatment related to the information. A situation such as this should not arise after 
the family has undergone genetic counselling in respect of the proposed testing. 
5.1.3  Disclosure would be contrary to the minor’s interests
Disclosure may be contrary to a minor’s interests where some harm would arise from 
the parents knowing the information, in this case a genetic test result. Perhaps the 
parents would withdraw from a child, or at the other extreme smother a child, who 
tested positive for the HD mutation, for example. However, such would be a reason 
for not	testing	the child in the first place on the basis of parental consent, rather than 
not informing the parents of the test result.
In respect of a competent minor under the age of sixteen, disclosure may be contrary 
to the minor’s interests for the same reasons: parents may withdraw or may treat their 
child as overly vulnerable because of the test result. However, if a minor is competent 
to have made the decision in respect of genetic testing, then the second exception 
permitting refusal of information to a parent is more relevant. Given that the minor 
is competent to make the decision, it should be up to the child whether or not the 
information is disclosed to her parents.105 In such cases, the decision should not be 
based upon the more paternalistic exception regarding the minor’s interests. 
5.1.4  Reasonable grounds for believing that the minor does not or would not wish the  
 information to be disclosed
In the case of a competent minor under the age of sixteen who did not want the parents 
to have access to genetic test results, health professionals would have a clear mandate 
to refuse a representative’s request for information pursuant to rule 11(4)(b)(ii), 
HIPC. Health professionals should check with the minor before disclosing or refusing 
to disclose the information to parents on the basis of this provision. 
If the withholding grounds do not apply, the information must be disclosed on 
request pursuant to section 22F of the Health Act 1956. If the withholding grounds 
do apply, the information may still be disclosed because reliance on the withholding 





Disclosure and privacy issues should be canvassed thoroughly in genetic counselling 
and clinical discussions prior to any genetic testing taking place, so that all parties 
have a clear idea to whom what information may be disclosed, and upon what 
grounds, before the decision whether or not to undergo testing is made.
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.2  Privacy issues when a minor has been tested by parental consent
Parents may want to use a child’s genetic information, gained from genetic testing, 
to have other children of theirs tested. This is a legally permissible use of their child’s 
information. Regardless, where pre-symptomatic or carrier testing is undertaken, 
parents would probably have the same cause to have all of their children tested, given 
the existence of the heritable genetic variation in the family. 
Additionally, parents may choose to tell other family members of their child’s test 
results to warn them of their own risk. A child’s parents are not bound by the Privacy 
Act 1993 or the Health Information Privacy Code 1994 to keep their children’s health 
information private. This places children in a uniquely vulnerable position. While 
adult patients can, to a large extent, control the risk of their health information being 
disclosed by choosing to whom they disclose the information, the ability of a child 
to control the use or disclosure of her own medical information is severely curtailed 
to the extent that her parents will generally be in receipt of the information and not 
bound by any confidentiality duties in respect of it. 
Whilst it can commonly be assumed that parents usually do not mean their children 
harm by discussing their health information, they may generally disseminate the 
information however they choose; for example, to the child’s school, the child’s 
friends, their own friends, sports coaches and employers. The child patient’s lack 
of control over the information, in terms of the parents’ knowledge and freedom 
of dissemination, could have negative impacts in the future, including social, 
employment and insurance discrimination. Such information must, therefore, be 
handled sensitively given that the results may turn out to have harmful effects for the 
child as an adult. 
Interestingly, Johnson et al. note that, ‘[i]n most cases, adults with chronic conditions 
were less likely to disclose private medical information than were parents of children 
with the same conditions.’107 This suggests that adults are more protective about 
genetic information when it relates to themselves rather than to their children.
Privacy protection is also of greater concern in genetics than in other branches of 
medicine as family members and relatives have a greater interest in knowing the 
information; and the information gained can be predictive, unlike other medical 
information that might be revealed about a child. For example, the fact that a child 
had her tonsils out is unlikely to be of much relevance to anyone or any agency in the 
future, as compared with the fact that a child has a significantly increased susceptibility 










Apart from discussion and possibly mediation there is, however, very little that a child 
can legally do to prevent the parents disseminating the child’s personal information, 
which may include genetic status.
Traditionally, in order for a breach of confidence action to be made out, the information 
must: ‘have the necessary quality of confidence about it’; have been imparted in 
‘circumstances importing an obligation of confidence’; and there must have been 
‘unauthorised use of the information’.109 The requirement that the information needs 
to have been ‘imparted in circumstances importing an obligation of confidence’ has 
been subsequently eroded in the United Kingdom.110 
Dawson has noted that a breach of confidence action may arise from third party 
disclosure of confidential information: 
The	duty	of	confidence	may	also	cover	third	parties	to	the	therapeutic	relationship	
to	whom	information	has	been	disclosed,	when	they	have	actual	knowledge	this	
information	 is	 confidential,	 or	 they	 ought	 reasonably	 to	 know,	 or	 they	 have	




A duty of confidentiality has not yet been recognised in respect of the unique 
relationship between parents and their children. A myriad of issues would be relevant 
if such a duty were recognised; such issues will not be discussed here as the duty does 
not currently exist.113 












And with respect to children in particular:
…	we	consider	that	the	criteria	for	protection,	requiring	private	information	in	





The tort currently only appears to cover publication of private information and thus 
would presumably not apply to a mother disclosing her child’s genetic test results to a 
friend. However, Dawson notes: ‘It is not entirely clear … how wide the publicity given 
to private facts must be. If only a few key people would have been informed, would that 
constitute unwarranted publicity at all, or would it be relevant only to damages?’117
Privacy issues are similar to those raised by an adult who has been tested and does 
not want to share her results with the family; but they are complicated by the fact that 
in the adult’s case there are self-determining decisions which can be made. Decisions 
made on behalf of a child can best be described as ‘other regarding’ rather than ‘self 
regarding’ and for that reason the child may be more vulnerable to disclosure of 
information which the child might have preferred (had they been in a position to 
express a view) to have maintained in confidence. The broader, more general issue of 
whether health professionals should be entitled or obliged to breach confidentiality 
(or whether private individuals should be legally obliged) to inform family members 
and relatives of a familial genetic risk cannot be canvassed to any great degree in 
this section of the report, in which the primary focus is on genetic testing of 
children.118 Suffice to say, in most cases parents will be aware of their children’s test 
results as a matter of course, and can seemingly treat that information as their own 
information for the purposes of disclosure. Health professionals are of course bound 
by confidentiality duties to the child patient and may not disclose his or her results 
except to those entitled to receive them (usually the parents) or pursuant to one of 
the statutory or regulatory exceptions discussed. 
.  should there be legal restrictions to prohibit parents from disclosing their   
 children’s health information?
Again, as with imposing a duty on parents to disclose genetic test results to minors, 
we are concerned about the enforceability, monitoring and any punitive mechanisms 
attached to such a duty. However, a duty of confidentiality may be more readily 
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enforced than a duty to disclose information to minors: the agency charged with 
enforcing the duty can take a reactive role once unwarranted disclosure has been 
made, rather than the more proactive and interventionist role required to police 
disclosure to the minor. 
However, the child’s privacy interests need to be weighed up against the interests 
served by allowing parents to disclose their child’s genetic test results to certain people 
or agencies (e.g. school or caregivers so that they can be alert for early symptoms) 
and the parents’ rights to freedom of expression (section 14, New Zealand Bill of 
Rights Act 1990). 
The lack of a parental duty of confidentiality and the difficulties raised by the 
imposition of such a duty provide another strong argument against genetic testing of 
children upon the basis of parental consent.
A general rule against genetic testing of children coupled with rigorous genetic 
counselling emphasising the need to inform the child of the genetic test result, and 
the need to keep the information private, may be the most effective way to safeguard 
the child’s overall interests: rather than permitting testing and trying to police the 
sequelae. 
Given the interest that a child has in maintaining the privacy of the genetic test results, 
where genetic testing of a minor is undertaken on the basis of parental consent 
(whether because it is clinically indicated or, more rarely, it is not clinically indicated 
but nonetheless deemed to be in the child’s best interests), parents should be made 
fully aware of the implications of disclosing their child’s genetic test results to others; 
encouraged to consider how the child might feel about disclosure as an adult; and 
encouraged to maintain the child’s privacy wherever possible.
.  competent minors and privacy
Teenagers	rate	confidentiality	as	one	of	 the	most	 important	aspects	of	medical	
care	 as	 it	 underpins	 future	 relationships	 with	 professionals	 and	 is	 based	 on	
mutual	trust.119	
Competent minors are entitled to the same confidentiality as adults. As outlined 
earlier, the predominant reason for disclosing a child’s medical situation and records 
to her parents is the need to seek informed consent for treatment. If parental consent 
is not required in order to advise or treat a child, such as in the case of a competent 
minor, then disclosure of information cannot be made to the parents on the basis that 
this was one of the purposes for which the information was collected (pursuant to 







into	account	 in	 respect	of	 treatment,	 so	 should	 their	views	be	ascertained	and	
considered	in	respect	to	disclosure	of	personal	information.120
5.4.1  Privacy Act and HIPC exceptions
Where there is no statutory authority or requirement to disclose health information 
(see earlier discussion on section 22F of the Health Act 1956), then health professionals 
must consider whether any of the exceptions in rule 11 would allow disclosure; and 
whether they want to disclose (given that they are not required to).121
Relevant exceptions include:
Disclosure	 is	 to	 the	 individual’s	 representative	 where	 the	 individual	 is	 …	 unable	 to	
exercise	his	or	her	rights	(rule	11(1)(a)(ii)).	
Kerkin states that ‘it should not be assumed a child cannot exercise his or 
her rights simply because of his or her age. Understanding and maturity are 
relevant to the ability to exercise rights’.122 A minor who has been afforded 
genetic testing on the basis of competent informed consent would also be 
capable of exercising the right to privacy.
The	disclosure	is	authorised	by	the	individual	or	the	individual’s	representative	where	
the	individual	is	…	unable	to	give	his	or	her	authority	(rule 11(1)(b)). 
Similarly, Kerkin argues that if the disclosure has not previously been discussed 
with the child, then the child could be asked to authorise it, and that it ‘should 
not be assumed that a child cannot grant an authorisation simply because of 
his or her age’.123 Again, if informed consent to testing has been given the child 
would also be able to grant or refuse authority to disclose.
Disclosure	is	one	of	the	purposes	in	connection	with	which	the	information	was	obtained	
(rule	11(1)(c)).	
If a health professional intended to disclose a minor’s genetic test result to the 
parents, and this was one of the purposes for which the test was undertaken 
(perhaps to assist the parents to support their child, or to give them more 
information for future reproductive decisions), then this aim would need to 




is	 disclosed	 …	 to	 the	 principal	 caregiver	 …	 of	 the	 individual	 …	 in	 accordance	 with	
recognised	professional	practice	and	the	disclosure	is	not	contrary	to	the	individual’s	or	
representative’s	expressed	request	(rule	11(2)(b)).
This seems particularly applicable to situations involving young children 
who would not be competent to give an authorisation and where recognised 
professional practice would be to deal with the parents or guardians.124
This exception is directed at allowing health professionals to disclose health 
information about a patient to someone who is involved in caring for the 
person and may have to make decisions for that individual. It accords with the 
guardians’ rights in the Code of Rights regarding information and consent, 
and the general common law and statutory guardianship rights in respect of 
medical decision-making for minors. However, it would not generally apply in 
respect of competent minors, given that breaching their privacy would not be 
in accordance with professional practice, and may be contrary to the minors’ 
express request. The consent of the minors would need to be sought before 
disclosure: generally pursuant to rule 11(2) of the HIPC, and also pursuant to 





This exception would become relevant, for example, where a minor refuses 
disclosure of the information to a parent (or another) when the minor’s life 
or health, or the life or health of another, is in serious danger.
Harm	to	self – If a minor tested mutation positive for a condition for which there were 
beneficial medical interventions available, such as the FAP mutation, but refused to 
adopt any interventions, the serious and imminence test may be met. However, health 
professionals would still need to consider: seeking the minor’s consent for disclosure 
(rule 11(2)); whether the threat could be lessened in any other way not involving the 
disclosure of sensitive personal health information; disclosing only to a person or 
persons who may be able to prevent or lessen the threat (this may not always be the 
parents, particularly if the minor has undertaken the entire genetic testing process 
alone); or disclosing only the information necessary to prevent or lessen the threat 
(rule 11(3)). Also, the HIPC Commentary recommends that ‘the purpose of the 
disclosure should be made clear so that the person receiving the information knows 
the limited purpose to which it can be put’, so that the recipient of the information 
does not take a carte	blanche approach to dealing with it.
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The criteria for disclosure would not be met under this rule in respect of unpreventable 
and untreatable disorders because the threat could not be prevented or lessened. 
However, disclosure may be permitted where the health professional believes that the 
minor may or has become depressed as a result of a genetic test result, or is engaging 
in self-harming or suicide ideation. Again, the health professional should consider 
discussing disclosure with the minor before disclosing, to ascertain how the minor 
feels about disclosure and what the likely response might be. However, ultimately the 
health professional must make the judgment whether to disclose or not.
Harm	to	others – This issue has been discussed earlier in the context of informing 
competent minors of their genetic risk status. Current consensus is that breaching 
a patient’s confidentiality to inform relatives of a heritable genetic mutation which 
places them at increased risk would not meet the threshold for disclosing under the 
‘serious’ and ‘imminent’ threat test.125 Situations in which disclosure of the minor’s 
genetic information would prevent serious harm to others may be even rarer, given 
that testing of minors is generally only conducted in families already known to be at 
risk.126 It is an issue common to all family members, and not just minors, and will 
not be discussed further. 
The circumstances in which unauthorised disclosure of the minor’s test results might 
be made should be explained to minors in genetic counselling before testing, so that 
they know the limits of the confidentiality duty owed to them. 
5.4.2  New Zealand Medical Association (NZMA) Code of Ethics
The New Zealand Medical Association (NZMA) Code of Ethics instructs doctors 
to ‘Protect the patient’s private information throughout his/her lifetime … unless 
there are overriding public interest considerations at stake, or a patient’s own safety 
requires a breach of confidentiality’.127 It also emphasises that patients should be 
made aware in advance, if possible, where there are limits to the confidentiality which 
can be provided.128 
The principles and recommendations within the NZMA Code of Ethics are on all 
fours with the privacy protection afforded by the Privacy Act 1993 and the HIPC. 
Indeed, in its recommendations regarding responsibilities to patients, the NZMA 
Code of Ethics makes explicit reference to the requirement that doctors accept those 
obligations to patients which are imposed by statutory provisions and the codes of 
the Privacy Commissioner, among others (Responsibilities to Patients, number 17). 
Additionally, the NZMA Code of Ethics does not differentiate between responsibilities 
to minors and adults in terms of privacy protection: the duty to protect confidentiality 
applies to all patients, except in those cases where statutory or other regulatory 
instruments suggest otherwise. 
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5.4.3  Professional position statements
The need to protect the confidentiality and privacy of competent minors, in 
particular, barely rates a mention in most of the professional guidelines and position 
statements on genetic testing of minors that we have examined. However, most 
profess significant concern for protecting the privacy of minors generally: the need to 
protect privacy is one of the main reasons given in favour of deferring genetic testing 
until the individual can make a personal decision. It is likely, therefore, that the 
relevant professional groups would also be in favour of protecting the confidentiality 
of competent minors. 
The HGSA Policy on Predictive Testing in Children and Adolescents recommends 
that test results should only be made available to the minor and to those for whom 
appropriate permission has been granted.129 
Wertz et al. also endorse the position that if a minor has requested a genetic test, he 
or she should receive the results and is entitled to keep these confidential even from 
his or her parents. However, they note that ‘In the reality of family living, this will 
often be impossible’.130 They further argue that if the genetic information gleaned 
from the test result would benefit other family members then the minor has a moral 
responsibility to disclose the test results to concerned family members:131 this is no 
more than any moral obligation attaching to any adult in the same situation. No such 
legal obligation exists.
.  third party access to minors’ genetic information
It is important that minors are aware before undergoing testing that they may be 
denied health insurance on the basis of their test results, or be subject to higher 
premiums than they might have been otherwise. Insurance may be an issue that many 
minors, given their age and circumstances, have not had to previously consider. 
The issues surrounding disclosure to third parties are the same as those for anyone: 
they are not all necessarily unique to genetic testing and they are not necessarily 
unique to competent minors (unlike the privacy concerns of children too young to 
give their own informed consent to genetic testing).132 These issues will therefore not 
be examined further in this report; suffice to say that competent minors enjoy the 




Competent minors who have had genetic testing on the basis of their own informed 
consent are entitled to the same rigorous protection of their privacy and confidentiality 
as adults. This is particularly important in the genetic testing context because of the 
greater family interest in learning the information, and the current lack of any legal 
duty on parents or others who learn of the results to keep such information private. 
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